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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes a comparative study of Octavia E. Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy
(1987-89), Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), and the Alien series
(1979-97). I argue that these three texts resist patriarchal oppression upon the female
fertile body. I examine how they rewrite and subvert such institutions as motherhood,
the family, and the heterosexual couple, in order to redefine and empower woman. In
the first chapter, I argue that Octavia Butler rewrites Western origin stories in order to
put woman and people of color at its center, which provokes a redefinition of the
essential woman. In chapter two, I examine how Margaret Atwood criticizes both
patriarchal and feminist ideologies in a satirical, pessimistic tale. She represents the
patriarchal rule as absurd and makes reproduction ironically futile. In the final
chapter, I demonstrate that the Alien series and in particular Alien: Resurrection (Dir.
Jean-Pierre Jeunet, 1997) represent patriarchy as a failure and empower the liminal
woman.
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Introduction
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“Don’t let the bastards grind you down,” Margaret Atwood’s famous pig-Latin mantra
from The Handmaid’s Tale, works as well within the narrative as outside. The purpose of this
project is to analyze how women’s science fiction works to resist patriarchal oppression upon
the female boy. Science fiction is perhaps the most interesting genre for exploring social
anxieties, because its reliance on both realism and fantastic elements allow for the most
grotesque—and thus revealing—representations. One of the prevailing issues in science
fiction is the theme of reproduction, pregnancy, and gender relations. This project explores
the representation of the (fertile) female body, and the coercive forces that promote—or
subvert—motherhood and the family. In particular, I will examine Octavia E. Butler’s
Xenogenesis trilogy (also called Lilith’s Brood) (1987-1989), Margaret Atwood’s The
Handmaid’s Tale (1985), and finally the Alien film series (1979-1997). I argue that these
three texts—where a series is understood as a global text—create subversive alternatives to,
and fight against oppressive social institutions such as motherhood, reproduction, and the
heteronormative nuclear family.
Darko Suvin has famously described science fiction as the genre of cognitive
estrangement. In other words, SF is perhaps the only genre within which to explore
alternative realities that confront or subvert the hegemonic order. Because SF relies both on
realism and fantastic elements, it convincingly creates worlds in which gender, class, race,
and sexuality, are revealed as artificial constructs vector of oppression. Science fiction is thus
probably the most adequate genre to analyze feminist resistance to patriarchal structures 1.
Secondly, and because it is partly fantastic, science fiction allows for the most grotesque and
absurd distortions of reality. For example, Octavia E. Butler’s Xenogenesis contains

1 I understand feminism as a movement of resistance based on intersectionality, which fights equally
against sexism, homophobia, racism, and classicism.
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obscenely detailed descriptions of hybrid, monstrous bodies; children with tentacles for hair,
serpentine tongues that can penetrate the flesh, a breathing-and-living ship. Butler takes

pleasure in mixing the monstrous with the erotic and the alien with the familiar when she
describes alien-human sexual encounters, families, and communities. The Alien series
represent both the phallic and the vaginal as monstrous in the shape of its “xenomorph,” a
grotesque, insect-like alien creature. The films constantly position the alien as an external and
internal menace: the alien could be behind you, the alien could be you. The purpose of these
representations is all at once to produce strong emotions in the readers/viewers (revulsion,
horror, strange desires), and to question and subvert the limits between the self and the other,
the normal and the abnormal, the desirable and the repulsive. These texts reject fixed
identities and sublime liminality.
I argue that Xenogenesis, the Tale, and the Alien series are resistant texts against
patriarchal pressures upon and oppression of the female body. These texts rewrite and subvert
the nuclear family, gendered parenting roles, heterosexual relationships, as well as the
possibility of a white idealized progeny. In all three texts, similar tensions are at stake. For
the three powerful heroines of these universes, motherhood is a site of loss (a child has died
outside of the frame of the narrative), and it is also highly desirable, either for personal
reasons, or for social capital. However, motherhood is also coercive means for larger political
aims, such as the survival of a species in Butler, the return to a Biblical patriarchy in Atwood,
and a means to obtain weapons and money in Alien. The coercive nature of motherhood is
illustrated by metaphorical or physical rape, an omnipresent theme in all three texts. Another
interesting parallel, specifically in Xenogenesis and Alien, is the association between the
fertile female body and hybridity/loss of self. In those two texts, being pregnant also comes to
signify becoming alien, as the infant the characters carry is both human and alien. After
giving birth to a hybrid individual, the woman also becomes hybrid. The similarities in
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themes across the three texts is important because it underlines the increasing anxieties of the

1980s around hot topics such as women’s rights, reproductive politics and reproductive
rights, and other social factors such as immigration and a growing number of single mothers.
The 1970s and the 1980s were two very important decades for women’s rights and
reproductive politics. Second-wave feminists and women of color fought for gender equality
and legal rights, and the progress of certain contraceptives such as the Pill (introduced in
1960) allowed for more independence for women. Many feminists argue that reproductive
rights are a key to accessing legal equality, because women need to have full control of their
bodies and their fertility before they can access the same rights and privileges as men. How
exactly is this “control” defined depends on intricate and complex power relations at the
political and social level. In Pregnancy and Power: a Short History of Reproductive Rights in
America, Rickie Solinger examines the rhetoric behind reproductive politics, which she
defines as a question “who has power over matters of pregnancy and its consequences?” (3).
The answer is never only “the woman,” even in the best of circumstances, because the
decision of becoming a mother (giving birth to as well as raising the child) depends on many
socio-economic factors—financial means, social status, family, work, state structures, and the
access to education, medical structures such as clinics and doctors, etc. In addition, the
woman must be able to make her choice freely.
Solinger criticizes the discourse of “choice” surrounding in particular abortion
debates, because it is used to veil social issues such as the fact that not every woman has the
privilege of “choice,” and if she did it would still be inadequate to reduce such a complex
problem to individual “choice.” Furthermore, Solinger makes the compelling argument that
reproductive politics always include racial double standards. She argues that while white
women are pushed towards certain decisions (motherhood, adoption) by anti-abortion and
other moral discourses (i.e. motherhood is a duty, contraceptives are sinful), African-
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American and Latina women are shamed into contraception, infertility, and giving up their

children for adoption, a point also acknowledged by Rebecca Kluchin in her book Fit to Be
Tied: Sterilization and Reproductive Rights in America, 1950-1980.
Kluchin points out that before it became a contraceptive method, sterilization was
used by eugenicists to separate the “unfit” mothers (poor, prisoner, non-married, non-white)
from the “fit” (white, middle-class, married). She writes, “Eugenicists considered ‘fit’
women’s reproduction to be productive, healthy, and beneficial to the nation. They viewed
‘unfit’ women’s reproduction as destructive, unhealthy, and debilitating because the children
“unfit” women bore were tainted by inherent defects that would cause them to become
dependent upon the state for assistance” (2-3). The fit/unfit discourse is coherent with the
theme of the good/bad mother often used in literature and television—the good mother is
passive and nurturing, the bad is the active and archaic/phallic mother (the original mother
who wants to devour the lives she has given). It also illustrates the stereotype that women are
unable to make rational decisions for themselves, and that consequently the state must
intervene upon women’s reproduction. In reality though, reproductive politics in America
determine a woman’s life and social position more than it protects them or their children. In
her introduction to Historical and Multicultural Encyclopedia of Women’s Reproductive
Rights in the United States, Judith Baer (the editor) writes, “Many controversies over
reproductive rights originate in society’s efforts to use women’s childbearing function as a
justification for depriving them of rights or burdening them with duties. It is important to
remember that these restrictions are not imposed only on women who are actual or potential
mothers. They are imposed on all women” (xxiv). It is thus clear that far from acting only in
terms of reproduction or population control, reproductive politics influence women’s rights in
general and the social spheres in which they can access to equal rights and privileges as men:
work, education, politics, etc.

5

While I could have cited here many more important studies, I emphasized Solinger’s

and Kluchin’s contributions because they refuse to engage only in debates such as the right to
abortion; instead, they compellingly unveil the rhetoric that makes such debates the central
focus, instead of women’s rights as citizens. Both books seek to uncover the power relations
that actively shape reproductive politics in America. Moreover, Solinger and Kluchin, like
many other scholars in the field, agree to the fact that reproductive rights and reproductive
freedom have yet to be achieved for women. The progress attained in reproductive politics is
neither fixed in time, nor is it definitely granted. Despite the legalization of abortion, for
instance, many states have put in place constraining laws and strict regulations on abortion.
Texas recently voted a law pertaining to admissions of clinic doctors performing abortions
into hospitals, which according to the New York Times has resulted in the closure of six
clinics so far, and pushed some women living in one of the poorest regions of the country to
travel for hundreds of miles to get access to care 2 . Moreover, the emphasis put on fetal
personhood—a discourse that, according to Solinger, was created some years after Roe vs.
Wade (1973) by anti-abortionists (Pregnancy 233)—is still persistent today, and constantly
threatens to overpower women’s rights as citizens in the collective consciousness. The
perception of the female body as a receptacle for something more precious—progeny—is a
constant theme in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis,
and the Alien series. The historical and cultural contexts in which these texts were created
are teased out in the narratives in the form of conflicting tensions, between desire and
coercion, between freedom and choice, and oppression, between resistance and acceptation.
Each text creates a subversive vision of the conflicts and contradictions within the
patriarchal system, a vision that empowers women—and in the case of Octavia Butler, people
of color. Each text resists, succumbs to, and/or criticizes patriarchal and oppressive
2

Eckholm, Erik. “Court Panel Upholds Texas Law on Abortion.” New York Times 28 March

2014 : All. Print.
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conventions and structures. In Butler, Western foundational origin stories are re-written with
gendered and racialized Others at the center of a (re)-creation of the Earth. Reproduction

becomes the means to transcend humanity’s flaws—high intelligence and hierarchical
tendencies—in an embracing of hybridity and difference. Atwood’s Tale, on the contrary, is a
bleak and satirical warning tale against both oppressive reproductive politics, and feminist
discourses. Reproduction in the Tale is impossible because of the absurdity of the patriarchal
rule. The Alien series also reject a heteronormatized reproduction scheme by representing the
failure of patriarchy, and consequently the obsolescence of its social structures—
reproduction, motherhood, the family, and heterosexual relations.
In a period in which reproductive rights and freedom have not been achieved, and in
which the legal—relative—equality between men and women is constantly threatened, it is
crucial to revisit such texts that create resistance and subversion to patriarchal structures. In
this project, I examine how Xenogenesis, The Handmaid’s Tale, and the Alien series as
cultural texts reinvent subversive structures that empower woman over her own body. How
do the texts play and subvert the binary between nature and culture? How is “Nature” defined
in relation to culture? What kinds of implications does this definition have for woman? What
role(s) does hybridity play in the narratives? How do the texts explore different social
structures than the nuclear family and its associated gender roles? What does “motherhood”
come to signify?
In the first Chapter, I examine Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy. I argue that Butler
rewrites foundational Western origin stories in order to place women and racialized Others at
the center of the creation of human history. Such a rewriting, as I shall demonstrate, has for
consequence the empowerment of woman. Reproduction in Butler is only possible with the
alien—hybridity is thus praised over stasis. I shall argue that reproduction is therefore used as
a means to transcend humanity’s inherent flaws. In Chapter two, I turn to Margaret Atwood’s
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classic The Handmaid’s Tale, which I analyze as a warning tale against both the intervention
of the state upon the female body, and feminist essentialist discourses about motherhood. In

the Tale, as I will show, reproduction is impossible because the patriarchal rule absurdly
refuses to recognize the function of man in reproduction. Atwood’s powerful claim in the
Tale, like Butler in Xenogenesis, is the fatalistic argument that society will never improve and
that minorities will always be oppressed. Such a rhetoric is extremely relevant today because
it warns us against “post-feminist” perception that everything has now been accomplished
and that everything will forever remain the same. My analysis of the Alien series in Chapter
three is a rightful conclusion to my project, as I argue that the final movie of the series (Alien:
Resurrection, 1997) has the woman-as-hybrid finally win over patriarchal oppression.
Throughout the series, as my close reading of the films will demonstrate, patriarchy is
repeatedly portrayed as a failure. As a consequence, structures such as the family, the
heterosexual couple, and the possibility of progeny are no longer relevant. The cyborg
woman is allowed to stay in a permanent state of liminality, symbol of postmodern ambitions.
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Chapter 1
The Genesis of the Other: Subverting Motherhood Discourses in Octavia E.
Butler’s Xenogenesis 3
“What I hope to wind up with in my work are a series of shadings that correspond to the way
concepts like ‘good ‘ and ‘evil’ enter the real world—never absolute, always by degrees” 4
--Octavia E. Butler

Octavia E. Butler is one of the first (and few) African-American woman writers of
science fiction. Her work makes a unique contribution to a genre that is both male-dominated
and white. It also gives voice to women of color within white feminist discussions of the
female body, reproduction, and motherhood. Butler’s fiction offers no easy solutions, no
straight answers, and it does not pretend to solve social anxieties. Yet, novels such as
Xenogenesis provide perhaps what is more important—subversion, resistance, and rewriting.
Xenogenesis is composed of three books—Dawn, Adulthood Rites (Rites), and Imago,
respectively published in 1987, 1988, and 1989. The story starts as a post-apocalyptic
narrative. The Earth has been destroyed in a nuclear war, and only a handful of humans have
survived. The reader follows Lilith, an African-American woman who wakes up on a
spaceship 250 years after the war. We learn with her that the survivors have been rescued by
the Oankali, an extra-terrestrial race whose purpose is to restore the Earth and give it back to
the humans. The price of this generosity, however, is high—the Oankali are a race of genetic
“traders” who survive by mixing their genes with other species. They demand a “trade” with
The trilogy has now been renamed Lilith’s Brood. I choose to name it by its original
title Xenogenesis both because Butler was made to change it by her editor, and also
because it relates much more to the central questions of this chapter.
4 Kenan, Randall. “An Interview with Octavia Butler.” Callaloo. 14:2 (1991) : 494-504.
Print.
3
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the humans to produce mixed-species children. Those who refuse are rendered sterile. Dawn
ends on the news that Lilith is pregnant of a “construct” child (human-Oankali). Rites starts

with this construct infant’s conscious memories of being inside Lilith’s womb. The narrative
now centers on Akin—his name, meaning both “a hero” or “heroic” in Nigerian, but also of
course “a kin”—who experiences captivity on Earth at the hands of human resisters (those
who refused to mix with the Oankali, and now live by themselves, infertile), and who then
convinces the Oankali to allow the humans the possibility of living freely and reproducing on
Mars. The Oankali, whose sole purpose is to create and foster life, at first refuse to let the
humans recreate their civilization only to destroy it again. To them, the humans have a dual
quality that make them so promising and at the same time violent and self-destructive—high
intelligence and hierarchy. However, it is Akin’s mixed-species individuality that prevails,
and the Mars colony is founded. Imago’s main protagonist is Jodahs, the other child of Lilith
and her partner Tino. After its metamorphosis, Jodahs unexpectedly turns out to be olooi. It is
the first olooi “construct” (human-Oankali) ever born. Jodahs could potentially be dangerous
because of its human heritage and the “human contradiction” (intelligence and hierarchical
tendencies). In the end, however, it is Jodahs who proves to be more adept at understanding
human behavior, and the trilogy ends on it building a new town, at peace with human beings
as sexual partners.
The complexity of the plot reflects the complexity of the themes and questions at
stake in the books. Although a large amount of scholarship is dedicated to her oeuvre, there is
no consensus on the interpretation of her work. Scholars cannot easily provide a unilateral
understanding of Butler’s novels, very simply because there is none. Butler’s work, like the
opening-quotation implies, is contradictory in nature. In this chapter, I propose to observe the
ways in which Butler understands motherhood, especially in the context of rape and coercion.
The intervention of a superior alien race into a world destroyed by human activity necessarily
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redefines the history of humanity and society. In this post-apocalyptic world thus, gender
roles, the institution of the family and the heterosexual couple are redefined as inherently
linked to the aliens. The Oankali are therefore capital to our understanding of Xenogenesis,
and especially as they are defined both by their inherent hybridity, and their obsessive need to
reproduce. The Oankali are a race of genetic “traders” that consistently and historically mixed
their genes with any promising species they could find across the galaxy. Therefore, they
have no concept of “pure” races, for to them any species represent the promise of evolution.
The aliens must also and inexorably reproduce themselves. This is a classical trope in science
fiction, in which the alien race is constantly portrayed as menacing precisely because of its
aggressive desire to “impregnate” human beings and reproduce itself in an often insect-way
(see for instance the Alien series, analyzed in Chapter 3). Yet, Butler rewrites entirely this
trope with her superior aliens, who offer nothing more dangerous than an increased, diseasefree existence and unlimited knowledge. Moreover, and contrary to the alien of most sciencefiction stories, the Oankali’s principal purpose is to nurture and foster life, to the point where
disease and death (even of their enemies) is a blasphemy. The originality of Butler’s aliens
complicates our reading of their intervention in the narrative: do they symbolize, as many
scholars see it, colonizers? Do humans become their slaves from which to acquire more
cattle? In order to understand the purpose of the Oankali, it is important to analyze the ways
in which the text rewrites origin stories. In the first part of this chapter, I shall argue that the
Oankali stand as God in the Biblical story. In a world in which “God” is a fundamentally
hybrid entity, people of color, such as Lilith, her lover Joseph, and a Hispanic Mary are put at
the very center of the creation of humanity. Moreover, Butler’s rewriting of the origin story
has as its purpose the annihilation of the idea of the “essential” woman as pure and whole. As
a consequence, as I shall demonstrate in a second part, institutions such as the heterosexual
couple and the family are re-imagined in a context where woman-as-mother is not subjugated
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or burdened by her biological fate. However, Butler’s insistence on biological determinism,
as well as the importance of rape and coercion throughout the narrative, beg for a more
nuanced interpretation of the text. In a third part, I will provide some potential answers to the
ending of the trilogy, in which the Oankali, through biological coercion, subjugate human
beings.
One of the most important foundations to Western thought is the origin story. The
Bible tells the story of Adam and Eve being expelled from the Garden of Eden because of the
original sin, the acquisition of forbidden knowledge. In Greek mythology, the Titan
Prometheus, who created man from clay, is banished from Mount Olympus for offering the
gift of fire to mankind, which marks the beginning of progress and civilization. In the secular
origin story, civilization is possible through Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract, in
which a society acknowledges the power and authority of a government, at the forfeit of a
certain equal amount of rights and duties. All of these stories have for common point the
concept of a pre-social world, a world without “society” or “civilization”. The existence of a
mythical “pre-social” world is important in part because it justifies the concept of “human
nature” and certain human behavior. For instance, the theory of the survival of the fittest,
based on evolutionary theories, served for a time to explain and justify imperialism and
colonialism. Post-structuralists and anti-essentialists such as Judith Butler criticize this prediscursive myth as a means to naturalize the domination of man over nature, or culture over
nature. In fact, post-modernists such as Donna Haraway deconstruct the idea of “nature”
altogether, arguing that nature is socially constructed in order to justify hierarchical relations.
For Haraway, the nature/culture binary is the structure on which all other binaries are
constructed (male/female, sex/gender, white/non-white, etc.). Therefore, the deconstruction
of the binary nature/culture would in theory, if not annihilate, at least underline the
artificiality of man/woman, sex/gender, etc. What is interesting to me in this first part, then, is
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to understand how Butler subverts this pre-social mythical world in order to deconstruct the

concept of the essential woman. In her introduction to Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: the
Reinvention of Nature, Haraway asks “How did nature for a dominant cultural group with
immense power to make its stories into reality become a system of work, ruled by the
hierarchical division of labour [sic], where the inequities of race, sex, and class could be
naturalized in functioning systems of exploitation?” (2). Butler, in response to this question,
asks: what happens to “woman” if nature, as understood as a pure entity by the origin story, is
rewritten by a race of aliens?
As a superior extra-terrestrial race, the Oankali put in question the primacy and
uniqueness of the position of humanity in the universe, especially in a theological sense. In
Xenogenesis, the Oankali take the role of God. Firstly, they quite literally recreate the Earth
from its ashes. The original sin, in the genesis of the Other, is not the acquisition of
knowledge but the self-destruction of the human race, and the Earth. The Oankali recreate a
paradisiac Earth, undisturbed by human activity and perfect in its natural state. Ironically, the
Oankali-engineered world is thus a mockery of a “pre-discursive” world, where humans do
no yet exist. However, this newly-reformed Earth is not “pure”; the Oankali have planted
alien forms of life within its ecosystem, for example the “breadnut” tree, from which Lilith
and the others eat delicious nuts. Some species, like dogs and cats, have not been restored at
all. Secondly, in a reversal of the Biblical origin story, the alien spaceship on which Dawn is
set represents the Garden of Eden, but this Garden is only a temporary place on which the
humans are trained physically and mentally to survive and dwell on Earth. Only carefully
“selected” humans can be brought back from their suspended sleep to be put on the planet.
Contrary to the biblical story then, the Earth is a gift to be bestowed upon certain humans, not
a banishment from paradise. Finally, the Oankali recreate man in their own image; they are
given special abilities, like Lilith and Joseph, and later if they decide to live their lives with
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the aliens, they create alien-human children—“constructs”—which are a perfect mix of both
cultures, thus reflecting the Oankali’s way of understanding reproduction as necessarily
hybrid. In becoming “God,” the Oankali redefine the concept of humanity. Their re-creation
of the Earth represent a world of new possibilities for the meaning of being human, as well as
human relations.
It is therefore significant that Lilith, an African-American woman, is put in charge of
this selection. Butler empowers her main character with a multiplicity of Biblical roles as a
means to subvert a story which has explicitly excluded both women and people of color from
major positions in the myth of the creation of Earth. Critics have argued that Lilith is chosen
by the Oankali because of her qualities as mother, especially because of Kahguyaht’s remark:
“I believed that because of the way human genetics were expressed in culture, a human male
should be chosen to parent the first group. I think now I was wrong” (Dawn 111). Many
scholars interpret this as a realization that women are better suited to “mother.” Yet that is not
what Kahguyaht is saying; he says “because of the way human genetics were expressed in
culture”. He cannot mean the ability to mother, because from studying humans it is quite
obvious that this role is reserved for women. What he means is the ability to lead. He realizes
that Lilith is best suited to be at the head of this new human society because she is a woman.
In this sense, she takes on the role of Adam, not Eve. As Adam, Lilith is charged with
awakening other humans “deserving” of Earth, of educating them 5, and of preparing them to
the contact with the alien. In addition, because she is the first human and the one chosen for
the role of Adam, the knowledge and vocabulary used by the other humans also derive from
her. However, Lilith also embodies other Biblical roles. As her name indicates, she is the first
wife to Adam, the rebellious woman who rejected her husband’s authority in refusing to lie
Although not entirely, as she does not yet reveal the plan of the Oankali to reproduce
with them. In choosing to reveal only partly the truth, and in further choosing the
Oankali’s ways, she also takes on the role of Judas in the eyes of the resisters. Ironically,
in choosing the side of the humans’ “makers,” she becomes a traitor.

5
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on her back during sex. In the Judaic tradition, Lilith is the mother to demons, which is
exactly the way later generations of humans on Earth understand the Oankali. Lilith’s
rebellion in the narrative is her repeated refusal to first lie with the Oankali, and then to bear
their children. However, in the end she does not become “free” like her namesake, but
accepts—or is coerced into accepting, rather—the Oankali’s ways. In addition, Lilith’s role
as mother to the first construct-children make her, in a perverted way, Eve, though an Eve
who symbolizes the end of the human race as it is 6.The multiplicity of Lilith’s character is an
important element of Butler’s subversion of the Biblical story, because it places a woman of
color at its very center. In “The Dawn of a New Lilith: Revisionary Mythmaking in Women’s
Science Fiction,” Michelle Osherow writes, “The Liliths we meet in S/F works are not ideal
as mothers, lovers, or alien others. Instead, they demonstrate women's ambition and ability to
support others without sacrificing or disempowering themselves. These new myths move
Lilith into a respected and essential category of female representations that is difficult to
dismiss” (81). The new Lilith rejects stereotypical representations from the binary of good
versus bad women. However, Butler’s fatalism also subdues this effort, as the role of Lilith in
this new Earth is eventually tainted by the coercive nature of the Oankali.
Furthermore, two other biblical roles are given to characters of color. Joseph, Lilith’s
first lover, is a Chinese-Canadian man who is murdered by humans because of the enhanced
healing ability the Oankali have given him. Joseph’s relationship to the “divine” creatures are
the reasons for the humans’ antagonism and aggressiveness. The figure of Mary is
represented by the first fertile woman from the Hispanic community of the mountain resisters
in Imago, who gives birth to a whole generation of deformed, sick, and dying interbred
children. She becomes holy because her rape—another subversion of the Catholic
Though where Eve is condemned by God to give birth in pain and be tainted by
menstrual blood, Lilith, by staying with the Oankali, is literally condemned to the
opposite: painless pregnancy and birth-giving: “[a child’s] birth hurt Lilith, but Nikanj
always took away her pain” (Rites 332).
6
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immaculate conception—results in the first, entirely human infant on the new Earth. At the
same time, ironically, “Mary’s” holy children are not a promise of future generations, but

they rather doom the entire community to disease and death. The mountain resisters’
community is punished because of their inbreeding, which symbolizes genetic stasis and
racial “purity.” Joseph’s and Mary’s characters and stories in the narrative are moral tales to
signify the humans’ rejection of difference—Joseph is murdered, Mary’s interbred progeny
condemns the community to death and disease.
The redistribution of Biblical roles to people of color is a criticism of the racism of
Christian visual representations of the Bible, in which all major characters are systematically
represented as white. In putting non-white characters at the center of the Biblical story, and in
endorsing a woman with the role of Adam, Butler is re-inventing a foundational myth in
Western culture. In addition, the figure of God, the ultimate white patriarchal representation,
is displaced onto a race of alien whose principal core is racial (species) hybridity and a
rejection of hierarchical power relations. I have demonstrated the apparatuses Butler uses in
her fiction to re-invent origin stories—the empowerment of minorities, and the displacement
of the traditional Christian image of God onto hybrid and non-hierarchical creatures.
However, what does the Oankali’s engineering of the new Earth mean to our understanding
of “nature”? I have already facetiously remarked that the new Earth’s entirely “organic” and
wild status is ironical, since it stands precisely as the mythical pre-discursive world that
Western philosophy bases its fundamental nature/culture distinction.
Yet, can this wild world upon which no humans have yet set foot be considered
“natural,” as it has been literally constructed by a civilized society? Before I expand on this
point, I want to underline the nature—no pun intended—of the Oankali race itself. The aliens
have reached the zenith of “civilization”—in the sense of superior intelligence, upward
development, peaceful communities, and even colonial expansion—by getting rid of
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industrial technology (the application of science onto dead matter) for “biological”

technology. In other words, every “technological” apparatus they possess is based on the
same genetic trade they hope to accomplish with humans; their “machines” (the ship, their
transportation devices, even Lo) are actually living creatures. Therefore, the Oankali are
organic in the most literal sense. Yet, they are undeniably an extremely evolved civilization.
Furthermore, the Oankali’s ability to control, modify, and re-create living organism—they
can cure cancer by modifying the cells’ behavior, they can create “prints” of human beings,
etc.—also signify their God-like ability to control nature. Thus, the Oankali are an extreme
representation of “Nature,” yet a Nature with a consciousness and political purposes. Butler
thus subverts the binary nature/civilization in that her alien race is both, and therefore
something different and hybrid at the same time. The new Earth cannot be “natural” because
it has been engineered by civilization. Simultaneously, the Earth has never been more
“natural,” since any technology is organic. Butler’s intricate world deconstructs the limits
between nature and culture, by making everything constantly of mixture of both.
There are thus two important moves underlying the Genesis of the Other. The first is
the rewriting of the origin story, and thus the subversion of a fundamental patriarchal
institution. In displacing the role of God onto a race of hybrid aliens, Butler necessarily
allows for the second subversion, the destruction of the binary between nature and culture,
which is, according to Donna Haraway, the basis of every other binary system (man/woman,
sex/gender, white/black, etc.). The consequence of the disappearance of the limit between
nature and culture is thus the reinvention of woman outside of an essential sex. In this new
genesis, human beings can no longer remain “pure,” as they must embrace hybridity under
the form of human-alien identities. As a consequence, the possibility of an aliened Other is
annihilated; everyone is alien, everyone is human, and every new generation will be a
constant mixture of both identities. Therefore, sexed and gendered categories as they exist
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within power relations become obsolete. Moreover, the Oankali’s basic familial structure

does not allow for gendered positions of power, because it is fundamentally non-hierarchical.
In the Xenogenesis world, the nuclear family with the patriarch at its head is irrelevant. The
family unit formed with humans is composed of two Oankali, an olooi, and two humans, all
of whom are parents to every child. Akin’s parents, for instance, are Lilith, Tino, Nikanj,
Dichaan, and Ahajas. Of these parents, no parent alone cares for Akin. Part of it is because
the Oankali society, despite its gendered divisions, does not associate child-rearing with any
gender in particular. The Oankali are by nature nurturing; their entire society is based around
reproduction and nurturing of progeny. As the Grand Central press version of Lilith’s Brood
phrases it, the Oankali are “driven by an irresistible need to heal others.” Not only do they
make healing their vocation, but they also thrive to educate and guide their youth, to protect
their family, and they are also powerful home-makers (“Akin could not help knowing when
he passed the borders of Lo. …The vegetation that touched him made him cringe at first
because it was abruptly not-home” Rites 303). Butler creates an alien race that lives to nurture
precisely in order to displace the constraints of motherhood from females unto others. In
addition, the gendered concepts of the home-maker and the financial provider can no longer
exist. Everyone in the community has the power to create “homes,” because they can directly
control Lo to form habitats, and they can add the “scent” that mark their family onto
anything. The human-Oankali constructs are also almost immediately independent, and their
genetic abilities instinctively allow them to provide for themselves by picking the appropriate
nutriments from their environment. Their self-sufficiency thus does not require a provider of
any sort but themselves.
Such a re-construction of the family is in itself based on the subversion of
heterosexual relationships. Monique Wittig has famously argued that society is based on a
“heterosexual contract” which guarantees the creation of gendered individuals. For Wittig,
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the individual is sexed/gendered to ensure heterosexual relations and the production of
children for the state. The Oankali’s natural heterosexual polyamory (a male, a female, and
an olooi, as well as an Oankali couple) intrinsically subverts the heterosexual contract, and

consequently, the male-female social and sexual relation. It also subverts the gender roles
within the family unit. The relationship that Lilith entertains with her family is composed of
two male individuals who accept each other’s presence and even engage in sensual acts with
each other, yet do not compete for females or for the patriarchal position. Lilith and Ahajas
(the Oankali female) live in equal harmony. In Imago, Lilith says to Jesusa “Look at my
family… There’s closeness here that I didn’t have with the family I was born into or with my
husband and son” (671). The closeness Lilith feels within her family group is perhaps
enjoyed because she has an equal place within the unit; there is no unique “male” to be
inferior to. However, the Oankali’s polyamorous system is based on heterosexuality, as its
primary purpose is the production of children. It is also strictly restricted to the members of
that family only. Humans like Oankali are literally unable to have sexual relations with any
other olooi (who is indispensable to any sexual act), as its “scent” make it impossible for
them to be aroused by other olooi. In other words, the Oankali-human polyamory only works
paradoxically through strictly exclusive wedlock, which is a fundamentally heterosexual
convention. As Foucault has outlined in his History of Sexuality, the creation of the modern
family as state apparatus in the 18th century required monogamy in order to protect the family
capital. The emphasis on female virginity as well as the moral condemnation of extraconjugal relationships for women in particular, were meant to prevent the production of
illegitimate children, which would threaten the inheritance of goods between blood-related
individuals. Therefore, the emphasis on an inherent “monogamy” (an exclusive relationship,
for lack of a better term) within the familial structure in Xenogenesis belongs to a
heterosexual tradition. Butler’s rewriting of the family and of heterosexual relationships is
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powerful, because it subverts gendered stereotypes and refuses to subjugate the woman in her

role as mother. However, Butler’s insistence on compulsory heterosexuality 7 , and her
heterosexual-based society is a drawback on these subversions, as it places reproduction at
the center of any relations.
Despite Butler’s conservatism and compulsory heterosexuality, the polyamorous
relationship is nevertheless subversive because the olooi is at its center. The olooi provides
constant sexual pleasure and gratification without failure, demanding nothing in return, and at
the same time produces timely, perfect children. In other words, the olooi annuls a
heteronormatized sexuality, and at the same time decentralizes reproduction from the woman.
Butler cleverly diverts her reader’s sexist expectations by creating a third “neutral” gender,
one onto which we cannot easily apply stereotypes, in order to displace gender roles from
females and males unto another, profoundly alien entity. Reproduction is no longer the duty
or sole concern of woman, since the olooi is the controller of fertility and genetic engineering
of the offspring. Finally liberated from a reproductive burden, woman can enjoy sex on the
same level as man. Despite its third gender, a number of scholars (and probably readers as
well) however interpret the olooi as masculine. In a New York Review of Science Fiction 8, for
example, Traci Castleberry argues that the olooi represents homosexuality. Yet, she only uses
examples of human males (such as Joseph or Tino) rejecting the olooi, and never assumes
that Lilith could act the same way. Clearly, the assumption is that the olooi in fact represents
male homosexuality. I strongly disagree with this interpretation because the texts explicitly
use compulsory heterosexuality and do not include any non-straight characters. As Nancy
Jesser writes, “It is striking that in the Oankali’s 250-year study of human behavior and
human culture, they never came across a reference to ‘faggot’ and need to ask Lilith what it

Compulsory heterosexuality is the belief that heterosexuality is the norm by default of
human sexuality.
8 “Twisting the Other: Using a ‘third’ Sex to Represent Homosexuality in Science Ficiton”
7
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means” (“Blood” 46-47). The olooi cannot stand for queerness because, in the world of

Xenogenesis, queerness simply does not exist. Man and woman are exclusively attracted to
one another, and the Oankali-human polyamorous family unit is a perfectly heterosexual
mirror. Butler’s rewriting of sex and sexuality is thus a surprising mix of conservatism—the
sin of the flesh is no more, the production of children is the individual’s duty—and
eroticism—unparalleled sexual pleasure is a necessary condition of reproduction. The olooi is
a site onto which physical sexuality as well as the burden of reproduction can be displaced.
However, the price of this displacement is the destruction of humanity as it is, which
is expressed in the form of the monstrous offspring, and the monstrous body. Reproduction in
the world of Xenogenesis has become synonymous with the loss of humanity as a pure
category, as the only possible children are human-Oankali constructs.

The anxiety

surrounding hybridity is represented by the fear of the monstrous. Lilith’s apparent prime
concern is not her imposed pregnancy, but the idea that the fetus is not human: “’But they
[our children] won’t be human,’ Lilith said. ‘That’s what matters. You can’t understand, but
that is what matters’” (248 italics in the original). When she was first introduced to the idea
of pregnancy by Jdahya, she had a vivid image of the potential construct children as “Medusa
children” (42). This image is repeated twice in the space of two pages: “Medusa children.
Snakes for hair. Nests of night crawlers for eyes and ears” (43). The trope of the monstrous
baby has at all times been a recurrent theme in science fiction and horror (see for instance
Rosemary’s Baby, the Alien series, Dawn of the Dead, The Walking Dead, and so on), and it
signifies two anxieties. First, the monstrous baby represents the fear of miscegenation (Dawn
of the Dead, for example), or it is a punishment for woman’s infidelity (The Walking Dead).
The monstrous baby is the consequence of a breach in the patriarchal social order, especially
if it is incited by the sexually active woman. Secondly, the creation of the monstrous baby is
possible because woman possesses a creative power that man does not. Woman’s pregnancy
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and birth-giving power is only available to her, and therefore the production of the infant is
under her sole control. In addition, the process of life-giving is mysterious and linked to the
abject, as the infant is expulsed from her body through the vagina. Consequently, the creation
of the infant has potential for monstrosity.
The anxiety surrounding the possibility of a monstrous child is thus linked to the
female body; she is the creator of life, and for that reason her body is mystique and abject at
the same time as it is desirable. The news of Lilith’s pregnancy illustrates the juxtaposition
between pregnancy and revulsion and horror. Her reaction to the news of her pregnancy is
violent: “she starred down at her own body in horror” (247). Because of the fetus inside her,
Lilith suddenly realizes her power of conception, and this conception is exclusively linked to
the creation of monstrosity in the form of an alien-human offspring. The superimposition of
pregnancy with hybridity or non-humanness is allowed by the impossibility for a human to
conceive without the Oankali, which makes it impossible to dissociate pregnancy from alienness. Arguably, the mountain resisters, who are the only ones to have somehow kept their
fertility, can produce “purely” human offspring. Yet in their case, incest (and perhaps the
rape of the original “Mother” 9 ) results in extremely-diseased children, and their entire
community is condemned to death because of this inbreeding. Therefore, the female body
becomes monstrous because it bears the possibility of a non-human progeny. On a deeper
level, what the pregnant or fertile body represents is monstrous in itself, because it involves
the passage from one individual to two. Woman has a capacity that men will never have, to
literally become two individuals in one body, in other words to achieve hybridity. Thus,
woman’s body and her reproductive power have the capacity to transcend the limit of the self
in the most fundamental way. The recurring trope of the monster-fetus inside the woman’s
belly (as in for instance Rosemary’s Baby) signifies the fear of the fetus/pregnant-woman
Rape is a constant threat in Butler’s fiction. Lilith avoids rape from Paul Titus, and she
prevents Alysson from being raped in the room of the Awakening.
9
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symbiont as Other, an Other that is never fixed, that constantly threatens the reality of fixed
identities.
The female body in Xenogenesis is inherently linked to hybridity and alien-ness, and
it possesses the monstrous capacity to produce a monstrous progeny. The theme of loss of
humanity and the possibility of a monstrous, half-human future is a central theme to the
narrative. I have argued that such a theme is linked to anxieties around the female body and
its capacity for the production of life. In addition, I would like to argue now that this theme is
also linked to the progress of reproductive technologies and the ensuing debates
contemporary to the creation of Xenegonesis. By the end of the 1980s, the debates around
new technologies such as Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART)—in-vitro, surrogacy,
sperm conservation, etc.—as well as their advertisement by medical professionals were still
extremely controversial. In Xenogenesis, the Oankali’s genetic “engineering” is specifically
assimilated with some of these technologies by Paul Titus:
They [the Oankali] took stuff from men and women who didn’t even know
each other and put them together and made babies in women who never knew
the mother or the father of their kid—and who maybe never got to know the
kid. Or maybe they grew the baby in another kind of animal…Maybe they just
scrape some skin from one person and make babies out of it—cloning, you
know. (Dawn 94)
The intervention of reproductive technology produces a strong social anxiety around the
definition of the fetus created as well as of the pregnant woman’s body. The emphasis made
by Titus on the “loveless” reproduction or the horror of a completely artificially engineered
baby (cloning) illustrates the threat posed by technology upon humanity. In other words, can
a baby produced in part or totally by technology be defined as fully human? What are the
consequences of the intervention of technology into the “natural” process of reproduction? In
Xenogenesis, the answers to those questions is intentionally ambiguous. The fears linked to
“unnatural” children evolve throughout the trilogy. Where in Dawn they are a major concerns
of all the characters, who refused to accept even the possibility of the human-Oankali
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reproduction scheme, in Rites the birth of Akin is celebrated, and Lilith exclaims “He’s

beautiful…He looks completely Human” (254). After she learns that Akin is actually “less
human” than her daughters will be, she realizes “They can’t help what they are…what they
become” (255). Akin significantly looks perfectly human, except for his inhumanly long and
purple tongue, which can evidently be easily hidden. In both Rites and Imago, the shift to the
main protagonist (from the mother to her children) signifies the evolution of the
understanding of those engineered children. Rites’ and Imago’s premises focus primarily on
the acceptation of Akin by the human resisters, and in the last opus, of the advocacy for such
reproductive means to the resisters by Jodahs. The Oankali’s reproductive engineering is thus
gradually integrated as an inherent part of the newly founded society on Earth.
The relationship between pregnancy and alien-ness, reproduction and monstrosity,
and reproduction and technology are the major themes behind the plot of Xenogenesis. I have
demonstrated that while Butler proposes a positive redefinition of the family unit and of
gendered relationships, this change came at the price of the creation of the monstrous. I have
also shown that the concept of the monstrous hybrid creature was gradually integrated into
the narrative as an inevitable evolution, which results at the end of the trilogy in the end of
humanity as such and the creation of a perfectly hybrid society. However, this ending is
problematic, because it underlines the many ethical problems behind Butler’s narrative. First,
how must we account for Lilith’s resignation to her forced role as mother and concubine?
How must we understand the theme of rape of both female and male humans? Finally, how
can we understand the ultimate defeat of humanity and its lack of freedom?
Lilith, who the reader primarily identifies with in Dawn, is the first one to be coerced
by the Oankali, who impregnate her against her will. However, this traumatic experience is
ellipsed from the narrative; we read the news and Lilith’s reaction at the end of Dawn, but
Rites starts with the birth of Akin, thus erasing Lilith’s experience from the story. Moreover,
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Lilith’s reaction to this coercion evolves from resistance and rebellion to resignation. Her

character goes from a rejection of the Oankali’s ways, to advocating in their favor. When she
learns that she is pregnant in Dawn, Lilith reacts violently. She is revolted at having been
betrayed, and horrified at the idea. In Adulthood Rites, though, her attitude changes:

’It [Nikanj] made me pregnant, then told me about it. Said it was giving me
what I wanted but would never come out and ask for.’
‘Was it?’
‘Yes…Oh, yes. But if I had the strength not to ask, it should have had the
strength to let me alone.’ (274)

In Imago, she tells Jesusa that she has forgiven Nikanj: “I’ve understood it. I’ve accepted it”
(671). Lilith’s slow resignation to her condition is coherent with Butler’s understanding of
human nature as doomed when left to itself. Human beings will destroy one another; the
human race is doomed if it does not embrace hybridity and if it does not embrace the Other as
salvation. Jodahs’s successful Earth colony, and the resisters’ almost nil resistance to it in
Imago, demonstrates that there is no hope for the human race to remain as it is. Accordingly,
woman’s decision-making, especially regarding her body and her reproduction—and
especially a woman of color—has no power on its own. In fact, the narrative frame gradually
erases the presence of Lilith: in Rites and Imago, she becomes only a secondary character.
Those two texts significantly emphasize Akin and Jodahs, Lilith’s offspring. The transfer
from a one character-focused narrative to another is not only a clever way of renewing the
plot, but it is also a subtle criticism of reproductive politics. The 1980s were marked by the
advent of reproductive technologies, and the aftermath of Roe vs. Wade, which for the first
time in history propelled fetal personhood upfront in the collective consciousness. As the
fetus was enlarged to maximum proportion in the debates around abortion, the woman and
her reproductive rights became increasingly smaller and insignificant.

Lilith’s gradual

disappearance from the narrative frame therefore signifies the insignificance of the woman
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behind the children she produced. In Rites and Imago, Lilith’s secondary characterization

renders her secondary to the main frame of action, that is to the development of the world she
helped create. Therefore, it represents both her resignation to her condition, and the natural
lack of agency of woman and people of color.
Furthermore, Lilith’s fate, like that of the other humans, is directly intertwined with
rape. In Xenogenesis, both man and woman must submit themselves to the will of the
Oankali. I have already pointed out that the olooi “scent” enclosing the family unit prevents
humans from being attracted to any other olooi. The same scent, which is irresistible to
humans, is used to coerce them into having sexual relationships. In addition, the more
humans participate in sex with the olooi, the more they become “addicted” to it. In fact, going
away from the olooi for too long would make them sick. This is one of the ethical problems
at stake for Jodahs in Imago, who refuses to tell his human partners about this addiction, thus
thwarting their freedom of decision. Significantly, Lilith also refuses—after much
deliberation—to inform them of this fact, despite her rage in Dawn when Nikanj had not told
her about it. The concept of “scent” in the texts has two meanings. First, it is coherent with
Butler’s insistence on monogamy, and the linkage she makes between love and addiction.
Secondly, and more importantly, the “scent” belongs to Butler’s fatalist and pessimistic
representation of the world. People will inevitably play a part in an evolution within which
humanity as it is cannot exist, because of its inherent flaws. Women in particular will become
mothers no matter what. Lilith secretly craved to be a mother again, but she did not accept the
conditions of a pregnancy (hybridity and the creation of the monstrous). The olooi Nikanj
nevertheless realized her secret wish by “reading” it from her mind. The olooi’s ability to
“read” people, even in spite of their own expressed opinion, thus flirts closely with rape
culture and biological determinism (Nikanj read in Lilith her biological fate to be a mother).
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Rape culture defines a society’s ability to blame rape victims instead of rapists. Lilith’s body
“wanted” to be pregnant, therefore it justifies overpassing her expressed opposition to it.
Interestingly, the coercion of Lilith into pregnancy is explicitly linked to the “rape” of
Joseph. When Lilith learns that she is pregnant at the end of Dawn, she says to Nikanj “”I’m
not ready! I’ll never be ready!”, but the olooi replies a little later “you are ready to be a
mother. You could never have said so. Just as Joseph could never have invited me into his
bed—no matter how much he wanted me there” (Dawn 246-47). Lilith’s situation is
compared to Joseph’s refusal, because it is rape in both cases, as in both cases a rape-culturist
justification is provided: Joseph’s body “wanted” to have sex with Nikanj, therefore it
justifies Nikanj’s coercion of it. Lilith secretly “desired” to become a mother, therefore it is
just to impregnate her despite her voiced refusal. The comparison made by Nikanj is
significant, because it illustrates how both women and men are powerless to the Oankali. The
theme of rape in Butler’s work is of course not a glorification or justification of real-life rape
per se. What it signifies is again the inevitableness of the destruction of the human race. In
other words, the extinction/evolution of the human race will necessarily take place, but it is
also for the best, as this pessimistic perspective is neither whole nor simple. Hoda Zaki reads
Butler as a “peculiar mix of utopianism, anti-utopianism, and ideology” (“Utopia” 247). The
utopic element in Xenogenesis is the capacity for the human race to reinvent itself, to
continue to exist, but under an altered form. For Butler, humanity can only improve through
the transcendence of its own flaws—high intelligence mixed with hierarchical behavior. By
embracing hybridity with the Oankali, humanity resolves this conflict, even if it means the
end of human beings as they are. The dying mountain resisters of Imago are a last
representation of the dangers of rejecting this evolution, which also means extinction.
However, for Zaki, the utopian possibility of the texts is thwarted by the fact that this
capacity for evolution is outside of human reach, and necessitates alien intervention.
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Therefore, Butler’s pessimistic point of view about the human condition is bittersweet; it is not entirely dystopian, it is actually filled with hope of a better life in which
human beings have become something else, in which they have transcended their natural
contradiction that pushes them to self-destruction. Moreover, the fact that Imago features an
olooi—a gender that does not exist in our reality—as the main protagonist and as the
establisher of a new world is a symbol of the obsolescence of a gendered binary system, and
the hope for a universe in which such difference would not exist.

Chapter 2
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“Don’t let the bastards grind you down”: Reproduction, Production, and the
Female Body in The Handmaid’s Tale

Despite apparent differences in genre between Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy (1987-89)
and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), the two stories are surprisingly similar.
They are both set in post-apocalyptic futures—the Republic of Gilead in the Tale is a post-US
totalitarian state—brought forth by man’s negative intervention in nature. In Xenogenesis, the
Earth has been destroyed by a nuclear war; in the Tale, man’s pollution has rendered the
majority of Americans sterile. In both universes, these events result in reactionary policies: in
Xenogenesis, humans rebelling against the Oankali return to a sort of primal patriarchal
society, while in the Tale, a fundamentalist Christian group takes over and reinstates the
Scriptures as law—literally. Beyond the characters’ attempts to enact Biblical patriarchy,
both texts rely on and rewrite in different ways the Biblical narrative. Atwood’s use of the
Bible is more explicit; the Tale imagines the consequences of taking the Bible—and
conservative, anti-feminist ideologies—literally. The plot is based on the story of Rachel and
Leah (Genesis 30:1-3) and plays on other religious tales.
Within the narratives, the similarities between the main protagonists are even more
striking. Both Butler’s character Lilith and Atwood’s character Offred are caught between the
desire for motherhood and the imposed patriarchal duty to produce children. Both have to
face rape (psychological for Lilith, physical for Offred) and the coercion of their own bodies
and reproductive rights. Like Lilith, who is forced into pregnancy, Offred’s sole social
function and reason for existence is the production of children. Moreover, there exists in both
texts an anxiety around the concept of hybridity—for Lilith, the fear of an alien-human
identity is at the center of the narrative, but a slow evolution throughout the trilogy eventually
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makes hybridity triumph over genetic stasis. For Offred, the fear of the possibility of the
“Unbaby”—an infant declared not to conform to Gilead’s standards and described as a
monstrous, half-human, half-animal creature -- constantly looms over pregnancy.
However, what is particularly interesting in this comparative study is the way in
which these texts work around and resolve essentially the same conflicts differently. I have
argued in the previous chapter that Butler astutely rewrites the Genesis story both to empower
the racially othered female, and at the same time to negate the possibility of an essential
woman. I have also shown the ways in which Butler negotiates the trope of the monstrous
body and the monstrous infant. The Tale works with different criteria: opposite to the
powerful, strong-minded and rebellious Lilith, Offred—a white, middle-class woman—is the
ordinary woman who passively accepts her condition in Gilead. In addition, while Dawn is a
third-person linear narrative, the Tale is told through the restricted perception of Offred, in a
non-linear, almost atemporal narrative. Overall, Xenogenesis follows the narrative
conventions of the science-fiction/fantasy novel. The Tale is disturbingly personal, like a
diary, and confusing in its constant interventions of the past into the present. Furthermore,
while Xenogenesis, with its aliens and genetic magic, is clearly fantastic, the Tale is acutely
realistic. The subjective introspection provided by Offred as well as the realism of its settings,
are what makes Atwood’s story unique in its resolution of the problems common to both
texts.
Like Xenogenesis, The Handmaid’s Tale responds to the increasing use of
reproductive technologies in the 1980s. Such medical inventions as the in-vitro technique,
test-tube babies, and surrogacy sparked debate at the national level, and in particular among
feminists. Do these technologies represent a progress over reproductive rights for women, or
are they on the contrary a veiled apparatus that guarantees more population control for the
state? In her book Women As Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over
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Women’s Freedom, Janice Raymond makes a scathing criticism of reproductive technologies.

She writes, “Because all [reproductive] technologies, drugs, and procedures violate the
integrity of a woman’s body in ways that are dangerous, destructive, debilitating, and
demeaning, they are a form of medical violence against women. Some of these, such as
reproductive contracts (surrogacy) create a traffic in women’s bodies” (viii). Reproductive
technologies participate in the discourse of “choice” that veils the fact that some women do
not have the privilege of “choosing,” and that the central problem is not so much choice as it
is women’s rights over their own bodies. Other feminists, in particular liberals, see those
technologies as progress, because it allows one the best information to make appropriate
decisions about one’s fertility.
The debate around reproductive technologies is only a part of a bigger debate, the
power of the state over the individual’s body, or biopowers 10. In other words, in what ways
does the State use female bodies in particular to control population? Rickie Solinger
demonstrates at length the different reproductive politics used by the State upon white
middle-class women, and poor women of color 11 . She argues that while the government
promoted ambiguous information about contraceptives, anti-abortion politics, and
emphasized adoption or the moral duty of motherhood on white women, on poor AfricanAmerican women it promoted abortion, contraceptives and infertility, in particular through
welfare and social services. Solinger’s impressive study underlines the stakes of reproductive
rights, and the ways onto which women’s “choice” is dependent on State policies. In her
Tale, Atwood explores these problems by creating a dystopian world in which reproduction
of a particular population is the main priority of the State.

Foucault’s term designates the techniques of subjugation of the State to control
bodies and population.
11 Pregnancy and Power: a Short History of Reproductive Politics in America
10
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The narrative follows Offred, a woman living in the Republic of Gilead, a totalitarian
monotheist regime located in on what used to be the USA. Offred—“Of Fred”, her designated
name signifying her status as property of a Commander—narrates her story as a Handmaid, a
woman appointed to a well-to-do elite couple for the purpose of producing a baby. Due to a
variety of environmental problems, the birth rate of the American population has decreased
alarmingly, and most people are sterile. An extremist religious group called the Sons of Jacob
leads a coup, annuls the Constitution, and declares reproduction the moral duty at the
foundation of this reborn Christian nation. The new political system relies on the reproductive
mandate to deny women fundamental rights, such as the right to work, to possess property, to
read and write—in short, anything allowing them power or independence. The women of
Gilead are classified under five categories (from the highest social rank to the lowest): Aunts,
in charge of the military “education” of women, Wives, Handmaids, Marthas (domestics),
and Econowives (wives of lower-status men). Handmaids are chosen solely for reproductive
purposes. All other women—lesbians, feminists, nuns, etc.—are declared “Unwomen” and
sent to work in forced labor-camps where they clean up toxic waste or pick cotton. The
narrative of the Tale is complex; as Annette Kolodny has pointed out, Atwood is an expert at
weaving past and present in her fiction in a surprisingly realistic way. We thus learn about
Offred’s “Before Time,” in which she was a wife to Luke and a mother to a daughter.
Offred’s past influences her present in Gilead, and since her past is our “present,” the story
produces the uncanny impression of retrospection upon our own society. Furthermore,
another complexity of the narrative is the unreliability of Offred as narrator. We learn at the
end of the novel that Offred recorded the story on tapes, which were discovered nearly two
hundred years later by historians. These academics reconstituted the narrative, but we do not
know to what extent they edited it—or even put it in the correct order. Moreover, Offred
claims several times that she is changing reality and that she does not want to “tell this story.”
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The ambiguity of the text allows for a multiplicity of answers to the intricate and
multilateral problems at its center. Like Butler, Atwood does not provide for unilateral
solutions—the ending of the novel, in particular, demands the reader’s interpretation and
reflection. In this chapter, I propose to analyze how Atwood plays with the same concerns at

stake in Xenogenesis. Firstly, how is “woman” created in the Tale? How does Atwood
understand ”woman,“ and how is her understanding different than Butler’s presentation of
”woman”? I argue that Offred is the only realistic female character in the book—all others
(Moira, the mother, Serena Joy) are constructed as romantic stereotypes, idealized versions of
woman that she cannot be. In other words, Offred is constructed in parallel to novel heroines;
she represents a non-romantic mirror image that the reader can identify with. But as the
narrative unfolds and the fate of these characters is revealed, Offred, like the reader, struggles
to continue to see them as heroes. Because they are romanticized heroines who do not accept
their fate (like Offred) and fulfill their function within the system, these characters are
eventually annihilated. Moira, the radical feminist, ends up working as a prostitute in the
elite’s private club. She will be killed as soon as she becomes too old. Offred’s mother has
been sent to the Colonies as an Unwoman, and is condemned to die within three years. Serena
Joy, the Commander’s Wife, is condemned to a purposeless domestic and repetitive
existence. Later on, Offred suffers the same destiny—the sexist academicians from the future
who read her records mock her and reduce her experience to a mere subjective, useless tale.
The second set of problems at stake in the novel is the juxtaposition of nature/culture
onto body/mind. How does Atwood subvert the myth of “Nature,” and how does she rewrite
the relation established between woman and Nature? The central, overarching ideology in
Gilead is functionality. Bodies, and specifically the Handmaids’ bodies, are reduced to their
function as wombs. The self is destroyed for the purpose of sublimating the body. In the
second part of this chapter, I analyze the ways in which functionality works to create the
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female body as the producer of a perfect product: the child. In the Tale, Handmaids are
constantly under the threat of producing an “Unbaby,” or an infant that does not correspond
to Gilead’s criteria. This is the true force behind the Tale, because this creation of a criteriaspecific object, the infant, is ironically produced by a discourse of “natural” childbirth and
pregnancy. The return to “Nature” in Gilead, claimed as a response to the problem of
infertility, is actually an ironical reversal in which patriarchy produces “nature” and the
“natural” pregnant woman in order to create a child that is indeed a manufactured product.
In The Handmaid’s Tale, women are reduced to and constrained by their social
function, which makes female unison against patriarchy impossible. The Aunts serve as

military “educators” of handmaids-in-training, and they also maintain power over women in
general. They are dressed in brown military uniforms. The Wives, dressed in blue, are the
spouses of the elite—domesticated women who have no other purpose. Handmaids are the
surrogate mothers assigned to elite childless couples, and they wear blood-red. Marthas in
green are domestics, while Econowives are wives to the lower classes of men, and they also
work. Significantly, their attire is a patch-worked dress of all other colors (brown, blue,
green, red) to designate their multi-functionality. These color-coded social roles are important
because they reflect the actual reduction of women to producers of certain very specific tasks.
Yet, they also signify the complex social relations between the women of Gilead. These
groups are established so that no fraternity or ”sorority,“ as the text suggests (11) can be
possible between them. In other words, the economic and social status of these individuals
prevents their unison against the oppressor. For example, Offred explains how Rita judges
her because she is a Handmaid (10), and generally blames her for the Ceremony (81).
Atwood’s astute tactic is but an exaggerated version of the very real fact that “women” do not
identify as a class because there exists no common denominator to all women. In addition,
there is a subtle racial subtext underlying these tensions: while the Marthas are brown, the
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Handmaids are exclusively white (Offred, the two Ofglens, Janine, etc.) so that they can

produce the elite’s idealized “baby”. Atwood is portraying a certain type of white feminism
by constructing these radically defined social categories: the women cannot resist against the
totalitarian system of Gilead because they are being profoundly divided among themselves by
this system.
The demeaning of women to their sole, belittling social functions (house-chores,
housewifery, surrogacy, etc.) also serves the purpose of dehumanizing them entirely. The
main female characters of the novel are made into paper-cut dolls, two-dimensional figures
that underline the absurdity of the Gileadian system. Offred, as the main character, is the
most realistic. Scholars have often criticized the protagonist for being extremely passive and
naively romantic. In their analysis of resistance in the Tale, Peter G. Stillman and S. Anne
Johnson even argue that Offred’s transgressive escapades with Nick only work into the
politics of Gilead, and therefore “powerfully construct her as a being who defines herself by
her body.” (76 “Identity”) To them, Offred’s definition of herself as a body is “precisely the
identity Gilead requires” (76). Although I agree with the fact that Offred does reduce herself
to being a body, I argue that this is precisely the way in which she survives. When taken in
the context of the narrative’s violent events, Offred’s actions represent what the majority of
people would do: survive by any means possible, avoid pain, respect the rules, adapt, and
make the most of every opportunity. She “chooses” to be a Handmaid because it is easier and
relatively painless. She does not help Moira escape from the Center because she does not
want to be beaten up. She stops listening to Ofglen’s plans because it is too dangerous. Offred
is thus not a novel-like heroine because she stands as the persona with whom most people
would identify in the context of coerced choice. There is evidence enough of this fact in that
we never learn her name, and that even her physical description is as generic as possible: “I
am thirty-three years old. I have brown hair. I stand five seven without shoes…” (143). As
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many scholars have pointed out, Offred’s own resistance is her narrative; but the fact that it
was never published in the immediate post-Gilead period (if she did survive long enough, that
is) suggests that the tapes were intended for herself only, as a reflection on her own
experience. It is also a reference to Orwell’s 1984, the classic that inspired Atwood’s Tale—
Winston Smith’s illegal recording of his thoughts on paper is an act of resistance against the
totalitarian state of Oceania. Like with Offred however, in the end this personal narrative is
meaningless because the all-powerful state consumes all individuality.
The other characters—Moira, the mother, and Serena Joy—are all made to fit into
cultural stereotypes of women. Moira and Offred’s mother (also nameless) represent the two
ends of a same spectrum, the rebel-feminist heroine. The mother is most likely a first-wave or
second-wave feminist; we learn through a video shown to the Handmaids that she
participated in the abortion rights movement. Towards the end, Moira reveals that she has
been sent to the Colonies (252). Moira stands as the new, radical feminist: she writes papers
on “date-rape,” she participates in the Underground Femaleroad, she rebels against the
Handmaid-system. However, like the mother, she ends up tragically as a resigned prostitute at
Jezebel’s club. Jennifer E. Dunn argues that both Moira and the mother are written as heroes,
in order to offer positive images of women and counter-examples to Offred (“Feminism” 85).
As heroes, they are believable only in the context of romance, and Offred struggles to
continue to see them as such: “I don’t want [Moira] to be like me. Give in, go along, save her
skin…I want gallantry from her, swash-buckling, heroism, single-handed combat. Something
I lack” (249 emphasis added). Offred wants heroism from Moira, and she wants to tell her
mother that she was right, that she finally understands her critique of patriarchy.
Significantly, when Offred learns that her mother is working in the Colonies, she exclaims
“Thank God!” Moira remarks that she should not be grateful because that fate is terrible, but
Offred’s utterance could be interpreted as gratitude that her mother is fulfilling her heroic
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destiny as a martyr (when Moira is clearly not anymore). Katherine V. Snyder argues that

Moira and Offred’s mother represent Offred’s ego ideals. She writes “Just as her romantic
relationships with men...are self-destructively framed by the generic and emotional
constraints of the fairy tale romance and Hollywood movies, so too are her romantic
investments in her significant other women” (“Screen Memories” 190-91). Therefore, Moira
and the mother represent something that Offred is not yet and perhaps wishes she were.
The most flagrant of this reduction of women into papier-mâché figures is perhaps
Serena Joy. She stands as the housewife condemned to the domestic realm, married to an
infertile and unfaithful husband. Before Gilead, we learn that Serena Joy used to be a TV
personality who preached for “traditional” family values. The Gileadian system reconverted
her to the role of Wife to a Commander, and Offred ironically reflects, “she’s been taken at
her word” (46). The transition to housewife-hood is underlined by the change of her name,
from Pam to “Serena Joy.” In becoming Serena Joy, she also becomes a mere image: “Serena
Joy, what a stupid name. It’s like something you’d put in your hair…in the time before, to
straighten it. Serena Joy, it would say on the bottle, with a woman’s head in cut-paper
silhouette on a pink oval background with scalloped gold edges” (45). Offred’s reflection is
significant because Serena herself embodies this paper-cut figure: she is no more realistic
than Moira or the mother. Offred writes: “[Serena’s] face is no longer a flawless paper-cut
profile, her face is sinking upon itself, and I think of those towns build on underground rivers,
where houses and whole streets disappear overnight…Something like this must have
happened to her, when she saw the true shape of things to come” (46). In other words,
“Serena” is but a shadow of her former self, she has “disappeared.” In fact, she is a mockery
of a stereotype of a 1950s housewife. Condemned to the house, she displaces her “maternal”
instincts onto her garden, which is both the symbol of fertility and blood in the text. Offred
mocks her knitting of scarves for the Angels (the military) (13), which represents the
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immanence and futility of her position (“I think these scarves aren’t sent to the Angels at all,
but unraveled and turned back into balls of yarn, to be knitted again in their turn” (13).
Serena thus stands as the opposite of the Moira/mother hero ideal; she is the nightmarish
concept of housewifery, without the children.
Moira, the mother, and Serena Joy are shadows in this narrative because they do not
fulfill the one and only function of the female body, to produce the manufactured infant.
Even Janine (a.k.a Ofwarren), who is the most docile and subjugated of all the handmaids,
does not manage to produce this perfect infant: her pregnancy results in an “Unbaby.”
Consequently, she also disappears; by the end of the novel, she is insane. The failure of
fulfilling woman’s primary function, motherhood, thus results in a death sentence: those who
do not abide or fail to do so are condemned. In “Maternity and the Ideology of Sexual
Difference in The Handmaid’s Tale,” Janet J. Montelaro applies Luce Irigaray’s work to the
Tale and argues that the reduction of woman to her biological fate eradicates her sexuality
and is a means for patriarchy to subjugate woman. To her, the scene of the Salvaging of the
“adulteress” Handmaid who is hanged means that the refusal of maternity signifies death in
patriarchy. She writes “In Gilead, to deny maternity is ‘to be made into an angel,’ to become
frozen in death” (247). Indeed, to fail at maternity, to produce a defective infant-product, is to
be “frozen in death.” Woman in the Tale is constructed as a productive object, a machine-like
womb. If the female body does not fulfill its purported function, it is either secluded outside
of Gilead (Moira, the Mother), or in the realm of the domestic and insanity (Serena Joy,
Janine). Offred’s obedience and passivity allow her body to signify the possibility of
function—but this is limited in time, as the Handmaids only have three chances at
conceiving. Ultimately, as I argue later, the function of the female body is ironically made
void, as male infertility is declared illegal and woman is made to be the sole responsible for
reproduction. The task of woman to conceive the infant-product is an impossible one—as
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demonstrated by the absence of any successful pregnancy in the novel—because the

participation of men in the reproductive process is not recognized. In other words, woman’s
function to produce an infant is preposterous because men are infertile, and it is ironically
condemning them because male infertility does not exist in Gilead.
Instrumentality is expressed everywhere in the novel. From the objects to the shops, to
the people, everything in existence must fulfill its particular function. In the chapter
introducing the world of Gilead, there is an emphasis on function: the bed is made for sleep
only, the flat-heeled shoes are only meant to save the spine, and the red clothes define
Handmaids (8). This minimal functionality is omnipresent in the Republic of Gilead: the
shops are minimalized to their core function—“All Flesh,” “Milk and Honey,” etc.—which
are represented by images. Since women are now forbidden to read, logically every signifier
is reduced to the simplest element, a bare image. Significantly, in the Historical Notes we
learn that Limpkin (who may or may not be Offred’s Commander, but who in any case is one
of the founder of the Gileadian system) is credited with the phrase “Our big mistake was to
teach them how to read. We won’t do that again” (307). Reading means interpretation,
diversion, thought; simple visual signifiers call to none of this. They, like the human bodies,
fulfill their primary, core function—significance—and nothing else. Evidently, the most
remarkable of these reductions to functionality is the names of the characters themselves.
Offred, like the names of all of the Handmaids, is a slave name indicating the status of being
possessed. “Serena Joy” is a pseudonym that sounds like a cosmetic product—exactly what
Serena is, truly. Even the Commander and Offred’s mother do not get a real name. Although
we learn in the end that Offred used these terms to perhaps protect her own identity from
potential repercussions, Gilead itself named their agents only by their function: “Eyes” for
special agents, “Angels” for soldiers (an ironical poke at the military, creator of angels?),
“Econowives,” etc.
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The functionality of objects and people is superimposed with the function of the
female body, the production of children. The objectification of the body is emphasized
throughout the novel, and so it suffices to give a few examples. When Offred and her mate
Ofglen see Janine for the first time, and before recognizing or even acknowledging her, it is
her pregnant belly that they perceive first: “One of [the two women] is vastly pregnant; her
belly, under her loose garment, swells triumphantly” (26). Janine is not the subject of this
triumph; the belly is emphasized over her. It becomes the object of envy and jealousy for the
other Handmaids; for Janine it is a token of pride and superiority. In Gilead, the body
becomes a more important signifier than the self, and what it signifies is the fulfillment of
function. Later on in the narrative, as Offred visits the doctor, she says “Covertly we regard
each other, sizing up each other’s bellies: is anyone lucky?” (59). Menstruation, on the other
hand, means failure (73). Another example of the primacy of the body over everything else is
the Ceremony itself. The ritual rape orchestrated between the Commander, his Wife, and
Offred is set during the time of her ovulation. Offred says, “It’s my fault, this waste of
[Rita’s] time. Not mine, but my body’s, if there is a difference. Even the Commander is
subject to its whims” (81). Offred’s body not only controls her; it determines the most
important social ritual of the new family unit. The female body thus takes primacy over any
other social event, to its gratification or detriment. During the Ceremony, Offred is laid down
on the couple’s bed, unable to move, entirely passive. Serena is the one in control “of the
process, and thus the product. If any” (94). Her body is only used as a means through which
to obtain this “product.” In this scene, the self and the body are distinguished: the
Commander is “fucking the lower-part of [her] body” (94). Moreover, Offred explicitly
signifies the construction of her body as reduced to its function. Before Gilead, she “used to
think of [her] body as an instrument,” but now it is merely “a cloud, congealed around a
central object, the shape of a pear, which is hard and more real than I am and glows red

40

within its translucent wrapping…” (73-74 my emphasis). The uterus thus defines her, but also
becomes more “real” than she is.
This body is directly constructed by Gilead in order to maximize its production of
offspring. The reduction of the self to the body’s function is emphasized by the long periods
of waiting that Offred suffers. Handmaids have literally no other function than reproduction.
The narrative of the novel resists linearity in time, because Offred’s life is so literally devoid
of any activity that she is forced into a state of retrospection. Throughout the novel, the reader
is made, like her, to reflect upon the time “before” Gilead through Offred’s memories.
However, anything unnecessary to reproduction has no value. Infertile women are sent to the
Colonies, where they are not expected to live beyond three years (248). When Moira tries to
escape the first time, her feet are so badly beaten that she can no longer walk, because, as
Aunt Lydia says “For our purposes your feet and hands are not essential” (91). The Red
Center, where Handmaids are taught their new function, also trains them in preparation for
pregnancy—they follow breathing exercises for birthing, they are taught rules to maximize
conception, etc. In addition, everything is made to protect the body, but only inasmuch as its
reproductive functions: Handmaids are forbidden coffee, liquor, and cigarettes (14), they
must go to the doctor’s every month (59), they have to bathe but only for hygiene’s sake (62),
they must exercise daily but not strain themselves, they eat according to a precisely designed
diet. The carefully planned attention to the female body signifies its objectification: the
female body must be protected in order to ensure its productivity. In addition, here is clearly a
concept of purity in the treatment of the female body—it must be protected from polluting
influences such as alcohol or tobacco, it must not be strained, but rather remain in an
effortless immanent state, and so on. Even the chaste Ceremony (everyone is fully clothed,
the Handmaid keeps her veil, no kisses or touches as allowed, etc.) emphasizes a certain
‘purity’ applied to coerced sexual relations. In order to maximize the body’s production of
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elite children, the female body must be kept into a state of chastity, both physical (diet,
exercises, etc.) and moral (sexual chastity). However, the definition of “purity” in Gilead is

tainted: handmaids are both prostitutes and chaste reproducing-wombs; both a pride and a
symbol of social capital, and shameful. In “Feminism and The Handmaid’s Tale,” Jennifer E.
Dunn remarks “The red material [of the Handmaids’ clothes] is meant to represent the blood
of the womb and the sacred rite of reproduction, yet this symbolically resonant color retains
historical connotations of both sexual allure and sexual shame” (77). Her analysis is
important because it underlines the blurred lines between purity and impurity: nothing is
either one or the other in Gilead, but perpetually both. The absence of definite limits between
the two is a criticism of the hypocrisy of a society that both hyper-sexualizes women and at
the same time demands sexual purity from them. Jezebel’s Club for example, the secret
brothel to which the Commander takes Offred, symbolizes the double-standards of the
totalitarian state.
Significantly, the body is also possession. The penalty for the rape of a Handmaid,
ironically, is death. Adultery is also punishable by death. As a means to produce progeny, the
body becomes rare and valuable, and as such it is more important than the self. The
privatization of the body is explicit in the Handmaid’s newly given names, which represent
their belonging to their Commander, and by the attendant elimination of their birth names. In
many ways, this is a critique of the Name of the Father—with the exception that in Gilead
monogamy is abolished for the elite. Nevertheless, and because it is so highly prized, the
body also becomes a means of empowerment for the woman. The most decisive act of
subversion for a Handmaid is suicide, as it literally destroys the body, producer of children.
Yet the body can be used on a daily basis for small acts of rebellion. Even when it is entirely
covered, Offred uses her body to provoke the guards. She looks at one of them directly, and
moves her hips as she walks. “I find I am not ashamed after all. I enjoy the power; power of a
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dog bone, passive but there” (22). Sensuality and sex thus become subversive acts in this
world of functionality. Offred’s relationship to Nick exemplifies this point, as it allows to feel
alive again. Before Nick, her body was estranged to her: “My nakedness is strange to me
already. My body seems outdated…I avoid looking down at my body, not so much because it
is shameful or immodest but because I don’t want to see it” (Tale 54). Her sexual affair with
Nick gave her body back to her. In other words, sex and sensuality in the text are means to
regain control and power over Offred’s body12. Furthermore, Offred can submit her body for
certain benefits. She accepts Serena Joy’s offer to help her conceive by seeing Nick secretly,
in exchange for a favor. Offred is given a cigarette and a match for accepting the deal, and
while it may seem like a small reward for the surrender of her sexuality, the match itself
becomes the symbol of much more: potential fire, potential suicide, in a word, destruction.
Even if she does not act upon it, the match exists as an open possibility.
In Gilead, the self is destroyed to be replaced by function: women are made to fit into
positions that shatter their self-identification; they become mere images. In addition, for
Handmaids the body takes primacy over the self. The womb, essential to reproduction, is
maximized and protected at all costs, while the individuals become but a shallow envelope
surrounding it. And what the womb is meant to produce is a specific, perfect object: a white,
healthy infant. The child is classified as Baby or Unbaby according to criteria that are never
revealed to the reader. I argue hereafter that the child-product is a white, perfect progeny.
However, this progeny is impossible because reproduction is made the entire duty of the
woman. In Gilead, it is illegal to mention male infertility, which is considered inexistent. As a
consequence, absurdly, Handmaids who do not succeed in conceiving the perfect childproduct are sent to their deaths in the colonies. The grotesque reproductive politics of Gilead
However, her relationship with Nick is also a criticism of Offred’s passivity. She
abandons any idea to connect with the underground Femaleroad with Ofglen, because
her life is made bearable by her escapades with Nick. Atwood is here representing the
idea that people will accept anything, as long as they have a minimum of comfort.
12
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are an exaggerated representation of real-life politics, in which the woman is made sole
responsible of contraception, conception, and child-rearing. Nevertheless, in Gilead these
politics are a result of a discourse of “Nature” and “naturalness.” Gilead made reproductive
technologies illegal and promoted a return to “natural” conception, pregnancy, and childbirth,
which I argue is deeply ironical.

The conception of the desired future generation is

impossible because of the lack of appropriate technology and basic sexual education
knowledge.
In Mother Matters: Motherhood as Discourse and Practice, Andrea O’Reilly
criticizes the re-appropriation of the term “childbirth” by the medical profession. To her, the
word has become a signifier in a Barthesian sense. In other words, the word has become
devoid of its original meaning to signify a different set of practices entirely. The influence of
the “childbirth”-myth thus created is so strong that the majority of women feel compelled to
go to hospitals to give birth. For O’Reilly, the feminist efforts to redefine childbirth as
“natural,” with woman in control over her own experience, is empowering, although
ultimately she criticizes these attempts as equally tyrannical. O’Reilly’s analysis is
particularly interesting when put in parallel to The Handmaid’s Tale, because in the world of
Gilead it is patriarchy that reinstates childbirth as natural and outlaws technology linked to
reproduction. The government of Gilead promotes a return to “nature,” which is compatible
with their effort at “purifying” the female body. However, like the concept of “purity” is
tainted in the text, so is the definition of “nature” and “natural.” The return to a natural
reproduction produces, paradoxically, the monstrous Unbaby instead of the perfect product
demanded by patriarchy. The idea of Unbaby is terrifying and traumatizing for the
Handmaids. As Janine is about to give birth, Offred wonders, “What will Ofwarren [Janine]
give birth to? A baby…or something else, an Unbaby, with a pinhead or a snout like a dog’s,
or two bodies, or a hole in its heart or no arms, or webbed hands and feet?” (112). This image
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of a monstrous child is comparable to Lilith’s fear of the hybrid infant in Xenogenesis. The
idea of producing an Unbaby is so repulsive to Offred that when she learns that Janine’s
infant was indeed categorized as such, she thinks “I feel an illness, in the pit of my
stomach…I don’t want to know what was wrong with it [the baby]…To go through all that,
for nothing. Worse than nothing” (215). The idea expressed here is not so much that
conceiving an Unbaby is horrible, but that the process of production resulting in “nothing” is
horrible. In other terms, pregnancy is understood as a long and pernicious process that should
be rewarded by the creation of an adequate product. If the product is an Unbaby, then the
process was in vain, there was a fault in the production. Therefore for Offred, the Unbaby is
monstrous not so much because it has brought about by coercion and rape, but because she
has been made to go through an unwanted pregnancy and yet the results are “fruitless.” In
addition, despite Offred’s imagined Unbaby, the reader never does have access to a
description of it. Did Offred’s vision come true? Because of the ambiguity of the narrative,
and because of the white Christian eviction of people of color and Jews from Gilead, it is
possible to imagine a racial dimension to the division baby/Unbaby.
Annette Kolodny argues that the purpose of Gilead is the reproduction of the white
race. Gilead has expulsed African-Americans, and has exterminated the Jews. Brown women
have become servants. In addition, the links between Gilead and fundamentalist Christianity
reinforce the idea of an attempt at generating a pool of a “pure” white generation. In the
Historical Notes, we learn that the infertility caused by pollution particularly touched white
men (it was the age of “plummeting Caucasian birthrates” according to the Professor, 269).
Can we interpret, then, the Unbabies as other than white? The monstrous appearance of
Offred’s imagined Unbaby certainly suggests a creature not entirely human. Moreover, the
reader discovers that it is common practice in Gilead to use men other than Commanders to
induce pregnancy. For example, Offred’s doctor offers to “help” her, and Serena organizes
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her secret visits to Nick for that very purpose. About Janine, Ofglen says, “She thinks it’s her
fault…For being sinful. She used a doctor, they say, it wasn’t her Commander’s at all” (215).
Here, there is a juxtaposition of adultery with the creation of the Unbaby. Janine is punished
for her cheating by the creation of a faulty product. Adultery resulting in imperfect or
abnormal infants calls to mind the “milkman’s baby” trope, or the fear of the mixed-race
child. In Chapter 1, I have mentioned that the monstrous baby is a common trope in science
fiction and horror, and in particular in punishment of a woman’s sexual behavior (being too
active, or cheating). The absurdity of the Tale is that women must have recourse to adultery
in order to survive the grotesque demands of patriarchy, and still then, the conception of the
child-product is impracticable. Patriarchy’s claim to a return to “natural” childbirth and
pregnancy thus results in a monstrous product, an undesirable.
The Unbaby represents the nameless, a monstrosity that transcends description and
must be eliminated immediately. Yet, this monster progeny is constructed through “natural”
childbirth, which is the irony Atwood is playing with. Gilead’s claim to a return to “natural”
childbirth is doubly ironical. Firstly, because reproduction is imposed on women under the
penalty of death, which subverts the term “natural” understood as what comes naturally,
without artifice. Secondly, because the cause of infertility in the former US is the pollution of
nature. Offred writes that “The air got too full, once, of chemicals, of rays, radiation, the
water swarmed with toxic molecules…they creep into your body…Who knows, your flesh
might be polluted, dirty as an oily beach, sure death to shore birds and unborn babies” (112).
The next paragraph even mentions atomic power plants exploding, and a mutant strain of
syphilis. The pollution of nature by men is an extremely important theme because Gilead’s
immediate reaction is to return to a “pre-technological” reproduction. Gilead is not devoid of
technology (there are still computers, credit cards, etc.) nor is it against medicine, yet it
outlaws reproductive technology. The rhetoric behind this rejection of reproductive
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technology is that in order to re-establish the essential, subjugated woman, we must also go
back to “natural” reproduction. In other words, the rape of nature has resulted in the
castration of white men (the impossibility to reproduce), and as a consequence it is necessary
to re-establish “nature” through woman. Woman must return to her original state of
subjugation in existing only as a tool for reproduction.
It is important to underline how nature is constructed in parallel to woman: the body
has become a “dirty as an oily beach” which kills both birds and unborn babies. The rape of
nature/woman by man results in the death of their offspring. Yet, “purity” is constantly
subverted

in

the

Tale,

because

it

is

inextricably

attached

to

‘impurity’:

reproduction/prostitution, chastity/rape, reproduction/adultery, etc. Likewise, the attempt at
“naturalizing” woman is equally double-edged; childbirth is ‘natural’ (without the aid of
technology), but it is coerced and the mother-infant relationship is made impossible. There is
something uneasy about Offred’s description of Janice’s childbirth scene:
It’s hot in here, and noisy…In the corner of the room there’s a bloodstained
sheet…The room smells too, the air is close…The smell is of our own flesh,
an organic smell, sweat and a tinge of iron, from the blood on the sheet, and
another smell, more animal, that’s coming, it must be, from Janine: a smell of
dens, of inhabited caves, the smell of the plaid blanket on the bed when the cat
gave birth on it, once, before she was spayed. Smell of matrix. (123)
The description evokes a stuffy, smelly room; even the rhythm of the last sentence brings to
mind a staccato, breathless speech. Roberta Rubenstein writes “…in the perverse relations of
Gilead, the distinctions between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural,’ between human and non-human,
are grotesquely inverted or reduced” (“Nature and Nurture” 107). She argues that in the
novel, the unnatural is expressed by the constant descriptions of people as animals, and she
draws attention in particular to the way smell and taste are used to signify the polluted state
of Gilead. She writes “The air of Gilead is stagnant, suffocating, oppressive: literally, the
polluted atmosphere; symbolically, the claustrophobia and oppression by its unwilling female
captives” (109 “Nature and Nurture”). Therefore, even as pregnancy and childbirth are
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reconstructed by Gilead as “natural,” they are both polluted and polluting. On one hand, the
claustrophobic description of Janine’s childbirth indeed represents the forced pregnancy
imposed on them, which creates a bad smell of “matrix” like that of a cat. The other women
are stuck in this nauseating room, to assist at a scene of childbirth that will result in a polluted
product in itself, an Unbaby. On the other hand, it is possible to interpret this scene as an
attempt at subverting patriarchy itself: childbirth is not a pristine, beautifully “natural”
process; it involves blood, pain, smells, feces. In writing this scene, Atwood is also
debunking the stereotypes that the myth of “natural” pregnancy could induce in men.
Moreover, in order to understand how the opposition between the

“natural” and

“non-natural” is inverted and thus subverted in the text, it is necessary to analyze and
understand Janine’s birth-giving scene as compared to the birth-giving of “before”. Offred’s
memory of childbirth in the “time before” offers a capital parallel with the present scene; she
talks about a film the Handmaids were made to watch at the Red Center:
a pregnant woman, wired up to a machine, electrodes coming out of her every
which way so that she looked like a broken robot…Some man with a
searchlight looking up between her legs, where she’s been shaved, a mere
beardless girl, a trayful of bright sterilized knives, everyone with masks on.
Once they drugged women, induced labor, cut them open, sewed them up.
(114)
The passage dehumanizes the woman completely, as it clearly associates her with the
machines she is linked to. She becomes an object, a mere cocoon from which to extract the
desired product (“cut them open, sewed them up”); her body is transformed to fit this
operation (“she’s been shaved”), she is made into a girl. The film is evidently meant to be
understood as a vision of horror of how poorly women were treated in the pre-Gilead world.
However, Janine’s preparation for birth bears some striking similarities: two women “grip”
her hands, while a third woman pours baby oil on her belly rubbing “downwards.” Aunt
Elizabeth, representing the military in her khaki dress and her “severe” chin, stands at her feet
(117). This composition clearly gives the impression that Janine is framed on all sides by
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people, with Aunt Elizabeth embodying the man “looking up between her legs.” In fact, this
scene also calls to mind Offred’s Ceremony—Serena is holding her hands, the Commander is

“fucking her lower-body,” violating her in the same way Aunt Elizabeth metaphorically does.
Janine does not look like a “broken robot,” but she looks like she is held prisoner by the other
women, unable to move or to escape. Technology and “nature” for Atwood are thus part of a
false dichotomy, both utilized by patriarchy to co-opt women’s reproductive rights. O’Reilly
writes that “Obstetrical literature…views the birthing woman as a machine, her labour [sic]
as a form of factory production that must be supervised, managed, and controlled” (“Mother
Matters” 32). Yet in Janine’s birthing scene, she is equally supervised and controlled—in
fact, patriarchy immediately takes away the product of her pregnancy. In order to produce the
perfect product, the woman’s pregnancy must thus be supervised by the most competent of
observers: the women whose lives depend on the quality of the production. Janine is only the
factory of this product; in fact, her childbirth does not even belong to her. The Wife “frames”
Janine and acts as if she is the one who is giving birth; she also gets to decide the child’s
name. All the Handmaids present chant in unison birthing exercises “Breathe, breathe…hold,
hold. Expel, expel, expel” (123), which turns the scene into an almost religious ritual. The
childbirth is their “orgy” (125). They also feel and experience psychosomatic pains in their
bellies and breasts (124) and they produce milk (127). In the end, and foreshadowing Janine’s
baby herself, the Handmaids hold a “phantom, a ghost baby” (127). Yet Janine’s baby is not a
human being, it is an object: “The Commander’s Wife looks down at the baby as if it’s a
bouquet of flowers: something she’s won, a tribute” (126). The resulting product of this
“natural” childbirth is an object that the Wife has won; soon it will be devoid of its humanity
and become an Unbaby. In the Tale, a story about women’s rights to their own bodies and
reproduction, the sole “natural” pregnancy of the narrative creates a monster that does not
deserve a description—a failure of patriarchy. Moreover, there is a veritably the irony in the
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Tale: because men wish to reconstruct the essential, subjugated woman as the only producer

of fecundity, they thwart any possibility of reducing her to motherhood. Because male
infertility is ‘illegal’ in Gilead, there is consequently no solution to it. Even when Handmaids
use other men than Commanders—which suggests, by the way, an ironic hierarchy in
Gileadian infertility: high-ranking, powerful men are impotent while illegal lovers are still
fertile—their pregnancy is unfruitful or disastrous.
In imagining a society in which women are only defined by their bodily functions,
Margaret Atwood criticizes the emphasis put on the biological “duty” of women. In “Popular
Culture and Reproductive Politics: Juno, Knocked Up and the Enduring Legacy of The
Handmaid’s Tale,” Heather Latimer argues that recent movies dealing with unwanted
pregnancies recycle, in fact, the same reproductive politics at stake in The Handmaid’s Tale,
in particular the emphasis on fetal life over maternal voice. In a subversive twist, Atwood’s
unmistakable irony reverses the return to “natural” practices preached by certain feminists of
the time and construct a natural childbirth that results in a monster. At the same time,
successful pregnancy is impossible in Gilead because of the pollution of nature. For Atwood,
reproductive technologies and other forms of “natural” reproductive techniques advocated by
feminists are equally totalitarian, and there is no clear distinction made between an ”inherent”
desire for motherhood and society’s demands and co-option of women’s bodies to produce
children. In the end, the Historical Notes leave us doubting whether any change is possible in
patriarchal culture for women. Yet, as the ambiguous ending of Offred’s narrative leaves the
reader to interpret for herself or himself the meaning of the Tale, the epilogue makes us
reflect on the way we interpret history and warns us against the dangerous notion of thinking
that “everything has been done already.”
While Octavia Butler’s ending in Xenogenesis is a mixture between utopianism (the
human race will evolve and transcend its flaws) and fatalism (the intervention of a superior
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race is necessary for this transition, and the human race must be altered dramatically),

Margaret Atwood offers a more nuanced perspective on the reproductive rights debate. To
Atwood, both reproductive technologies and the return to “naturalness” advocated by certain
feminists are equally subjugating women. Atwood’s Tale offers no solution to the problem,
and on the contrary to Butler, she doubts that history will ever improve. Offred’s tale is not
only decomposed, edited, and transformed, it is also not taken seriously. The academics read
her story as an interesting historical or literary artifact, but they do not see the political tropes
behind it, nor do they understand the oppression that Offred lived through. In fact, they
justify it: “Gileadean society was under a good deal of pressure, demographic and otherwise,
and was subject to factors from which we ourselves are happily more free. Our job is not to
censure but to understand (Applause)” (267). The implication here is that this modern society
is unlike Gilead because they are not subjected to such “pressure” and “factors.” They
understand because they would most likely resort to the same techniques is “pressured”
enough. Octavia Butler, like Atwood, knows that history repeats itself and that hierarchy will
always favor oppression, but she imagines a solution outside of the loop: transforming
humanity into something else, something alien and better, using reproduction. Atwood offers
an ambiguous ending, with no reassurance even as to the fate of her characters. The fact that
there is no reproduction possible in the Tale signifies that the point of the novel is not so
much to enter the debate of “choice” or even of women’s rights, but to act as a warning tale
against both debates.

Chapter 3
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“Father’s Dead, Asshole”: The End of Patriarchy and the Beginning of
the New Woman in the Alien Series

The Alien franchise started in 1979 with Ridley Scott’s Alien, one of the first sciencefiction horror films. James Cameron’s sequel Aliens (1986), although made as an action
movie, is equally critically acclaimed. The two subsequent movies, debutant David Fincher’s
Alien3 (1992) and French director Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s Alien: Resurrection (1997), have
achieved far less recognition—Fincher’s film is widely considered a disaster while
screenwriter Joss Whedon, who wrote Resurrection, called it the worst mistake of his
career 13. Two additional films using the Alien race belong to a related franchise, Alien vs.
Predator (with two films, Alien vs. Predator in 2004 and Alien vs. Predator: Requiem in
2007), although they have been firmly condemned by critics. However, the Alien franchise
continues to intrigue fans, especially after Ridley Scott’s blockbuster “prequel” Prometheus
(2012). Academics have created an immense discussion about the themes of reproduction,
motherhood, and gender representation around the four films, which often stand as primary
examples of the postmodern concerns and anxieties at stake in science fiction and horror.
However, the purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the representations of both mother and
father, as well as pregnancy and motherhood, but rather to examine how the films
consistently resist these themes. The Alien series as a whole is particularly important to my
project because it entirely rejects institutions such as the family, motherhood, pregnancy, and
progeny. While Octavia Butler in Xenogenesis embraced reproduction as a means for

“Joss Whedon Reflects on What Went Wrong with Alien: Resurrection”
http://www.comicbookmovie.com/fansites/JoshWildingNewsAndReviews/news/?a=7
7814
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evolution, and while Margaret Atwood in The Handmaid’s Tale created a universe within
which reproduction was impossible, the Alien series goes beyond: it repeatedly makes these
institutions irrelevant and obsolete. In the films the woman-as-hybrid is not the resigned
heroine of Xenogenesis, nor is she the ambiguous survivor of oppression like in the Tale: she
is the victor who has transcended all previous institutions.
Lieutenant Ellen Ripley (Sigourney Weaver), the main protagonist of the four films, is
a unique character in the Hollywood tradition. She is continually strong and independent,
consistently more intelligent and courageous than male characters, highly identifiable and yet
not hyper-sexualized, and she embodies the trope of the reluctant hero who saves the world.
Like Lilith in the Xenogenesis trilogy, Ripley is singled out by the company as its only hope
in Aliens—though only after everything else has failed. Also like Lilith, Ripley is confronted
with a race of aliens that are so radically inhuman that the mere sight of them is revolting.
Although the Oankali and the alien race in Alien are very different (the former being noble
and good-intentioned, the latter violent and destructive), they have the same unique,
obsessive goal of perpetuating their race. For both alien races, this can only be achieved with
and through human beings. In Alien, the aliens lay eggs that only open when a living host is
found. The larvae contained in the egg—called a ‘facehugger’—attaches itself to a human
face to impregnate its victim. The implanted larvae matures within the host and is born by
devouring its way out of the thorax. Furthermore, the character evolution of both Lilith and
Ripley is equally similar: from a blatant rejection of the aliened Other, to an embracing of
hybridity in the end.
The theme of rape, like in Xenogenesis and Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, is also
omnipresent. Ripley is metaphorically raped by Ash in Alien, and a group of prisoners
attempt to rape her in Alien3. Like Lilith and like what could/would have happened to Offred
in the Tale, Ripley is impregnated against her will by the alien in 3. In the Tale and Alien,
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rape or the threat of rape is caused by patriarchal structures—the government and the
military. In all three texts, it is also a means of coercion always linked to reproduction. The
series works with complex and intricate themes of motherhood and mother-daughter

relationships. One of the primary common points between the heroines of the three texts
examined in this thesis is the concept of motherhood as a site of loss. Lilith, Offred, and
Ripley have all lost their child outside of the narrative frame—Ripley’s daughter has died in
between Alien and Aliens, as Ripley was stuck in hyper-sleep for 57 years. As a consequence,
motherhood is both highly desirable and at the same time a threat to the individual’s integrity
and the limits of the self. In the Alien series, pregnancy exists only under the form of an alien
impregnation, and with the certainty of death to the “mother” caused by the alien fetus.
Furthermore, even when pregnancy does not result in death in Resurrection—the fetus is
extracted from Ripley before it can kill her—the female body itself becomes alien: Ripley has
alien blood in her as well as enhanced super-human capacities. Alien, thus, like Xenogenesis,
juxtaposes pregnancy with hybridity; in other words, the consequence of reproduction is
always intertwined with a necessary redefinition of the self, and in particular of the self as
human.
However, the Alien series presents some obvious differences from the two other texts.
Firstly, the medium of the film creates a very different set of signifiers. The film represents
by showing, while the text describes and leaves to interpretation. Furthermore, the cinema
“sutures” the viewer to the film; the viewer “cannot” escape the film, and she/he cannot
control what she/he sees---the point of view of the view is that of the camera. In addition, the
Hollywood tradition is that of economy—everything on screen signifies something to the
story. This difference in medium is even more significant within the science-fiction horror
genre. As a non-realistic genre, science-fiction horror allows for the wildest, most violent
representations of social anxieties. Caroline Joan Picart writes that “cinemyths are public
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performance spaces within which patriarchal and matriarchal myths compete with each other,
and where conservative and progressive ideological forces struggle against each other in
working through collective anxieties, traumas or aspirations” (“Ripley as Interstitial
Character” 1). Because of the suture intrinsic to the cinema, horror is particularly efficient in
manipulating the viewer’s emotions. In addition, horror exults in breaking of taboo, in
reveling in the abject, and in subverting boundaries. As a result, the shocking images
produced in the genre are revelatory of those limits.
Secondly, the Alien series is unique because it is imagined and produced by four
different directors, which allows the overarching plot as well as the character of Ripley to
evolve in interesting ways. Thanks to the difference in perspective of both the directors and
the writers, the story created by the four films is quite complex and contradictory. The Alien
series proposes different possibilities than the other texts analyzed in this project, to the
problems at stake in the texts: rape, bodily rights, reproduction, and hybridity. I have argued
that Octavia Butler rewrites Biblical myths in order to displace conventions of motherhood
and the family in her text. In Atwood’s Tale, reproduction is made impossible by the rape of
nature by patriarchy—women are incapable of producing the desired progeny-object because
the patriarchal rule is absurd: male infertility is no longer recognized, despite the fact that it is
the sole responsible for the failure of reproduction. In this chapter, I want to take a step back
from academic debates on the signification and representation of the mother in Alien, but
rather observe how the films resist motherhood, reproduction, and the family.
Barbara Creed’s article “Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary
Abjection” (1986) is one of the key texts in the discussion around Alien and gender. Creed
applies Julia Kristeva’s theory of the abject to explain the movies’ horrific representation of
childbirth, genitalia, and the mother. The abject is represented by social taboos about bodily
fluids (pus, vomit, blood, feces, urine, etc.) that need to be expulsed in order to define the
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subject. The abject is thus the “not-I,” representing the limits of self. It is also the limit of the
symbolic order. As such, the mother becomes ‘abject’, for she, too, needs to be rejected by
the subject in order to embrace the father’s symbolic order. Creed argues that Alien
repeatedly portrays the primal scene as horrific, and understands the alien and its
environment as a representation of the archaic mother and the phallic woman. In particular,
she makes a compelling analysis of the film’s settings as vaginal (the ship, the alien planet)
and of the numerous phallic images throughout the movie. Finally, Creed interprets the end of
the movie as a successful repression of the dangerous desire of the archaic mother—to devour
the life she has created—as Ripley kills the alien and returns to the pristine sleeping pods of
the ship, both reassuringly feminine and nurturing towards the ship’s cat. Although Creed’s
article has forever shaped the way in which we read horror movies, many scholars have seen
since criticized her work and proposed alternative interpretations.
In particular, Catherine Constable challenges Creed’s Kristevan reading of the
movies, which she analyses as a whole 14. For Constable the alien craft is a tomb rather than a
womb. The alien egg represents the womb seen from inside, while the facehugger represents
the placenta and its tail the umbilical cord (179). Therefore, the scene of the facehugger’s
attack on Kane (John Hurt) (the first victim of the crew) is shocking because it puts the inside
of the body outside, and it covers the face which is the primary site of individuation (181). To
her, the movie illustrates Kristeva’s theory of the body as container, in which the alien serves
as limits. Moreover, Constable adds a careful analysis of Resurrection to her argument, which
makes Creed’s reading (albeit only of the first opus) more complex. She argues that
Resurrection effectively blurs the limit between the self and the alien, as Ripley becomes all
at once clone, alien, and human. Therefore, Resurrection does not conform to the structures

14
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of the Kristevan abject, for in the movie Ripley must embrace the abject (the alien) as part of
herself.
Both interpretations underline key elements and important themes of the films. It is
undeniable that the mother as depicted in the franchise is a representation of what

psychoanalysis has revealed about the process of subject-formation. Other scholars have
provided useful insights to the discussion, debating the relevance of Creed’s interpretation
now that the series is more complete. However, it is important to step back from too close a
look at representations of motherhood, and observe instead how motherhood is perpetually
annihilated. Despite the evident themes of the series, it is crucial to understand the different
texts’ constant rejection of the possibilities of progeny, the nuclear family, and the pregnant
body. It is often noted that any attempt at a romantic subtext—in Aliens and Alien3, in
particular—is always nipped in the bud (i.e., Ripley’s lovers die), and that in fact, none of the
four movies of the series has any remotely sexual scene. This is even more surprising in that
blockbuster science fiction movies usually include at least one—one needs only watch trailers
to have access to it. While many scholars see in this fact the desire to create a perfectly
asexual female mother-heroine, I want to expand on this rather simple explanation to suggest
that the texts actually create a universe in which sexuality, traditional motherhood, and
reproduction are irrelevant to woman. Each and every one of the movies perpetually
annihilates the possibility of progeny. In Alien, “Mother”—the computer controlling the
ship—is destroyed, and Ripley kills the alien, whose principal threat is the production of
more aliens. In Aliens, Ripley’s daughter, of whom mention was never made in the original
movie, is dead when Ripley comes back to Earth. The purpose of this elimination of Ripley’s
progeny is twofold: first, it justifies in part her decision to go back to the alien planet (since
she no longer has emotional ties to Earth). Secondly, Ripley’s daughter was created by
Cameron in order to explain Ripley’s maternal attachment to the little girl Newt (Carrie
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Henn), the only survivor of the colony. Yet, Newt is immediately eliminated in the first ten
minutes of Alien3, because Ripley needed to be set as an outcast for the purposes of the
movie. In the same film, Ripley kills herself in order to escape “giving birth” to the alien
parasite inside her. In addition, Ripley perpetually murders the progeny of the alien Queen
throughout the series. In a telling scene in Aliens, she burns an entire nest of alien eggs.
Finally in Resurrection, Ripley murders her own alien-human infant in a shocking abortion
scene.
The constant annihilation of the possibility of progeny is reinforced by the death of
the nuclear family. In Aliens, Newt’s family—mom and dad, and little brother—all die.
Ripley’s potential family—with romantic interest Captain Hicks (Michael Beihn) and Newt
herself—also dies at the beginning of 3. In addition, “mother” and “father” are two figures
that are repeatedly killed throughout the series, either metaphorically or literally. The
possibility of the heterosexual couple is also equally eliminated: in Resurrection, the couple
Captain Frank Elgyn (Michael Wincott) and Sabra Hillard (Kim Flowers) (whose most sexual
scene is a foot-rub), both die. Despite the different directors and writers in each film, these
consistent tropes of elimination cannot be ignored, especially in a discussion about
reproduction, motherhood, and the female body, and especially considering the happy-ending
scene of Resurrection. The possibility of progeny, the nuclear family and the heterosexual
couple, as well as the pregnant body, are repeatedly rejected. Patriarchy is repeatedly shown
as a complete failure because it can neither hear nor understand the voices of its Others.
However, as a result of this failure, and within the postmodern possibilities of space, a variety
of counter-discourses are produced. Social structures such as the family, the heterosexual
couple, mother and father, as well as sex and sexuality, become irrelevant to the story and to
the heroine. In the world in which Father has died, the woman can exist and survive in her
state of liminality.
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In the Alien series, patriarchy—represented by the company and military groups—

never succeed in the colonization of the alien race. Their plans are persistently annihilated by
Ripley. The failure of patriarchy in controlling either the aliens or minorities, as I shall argue,
is one of the key element to understand how the series resist structures like the family. In
2122, the Nostromo, a commercial ship working for the Weyland-Yutani corporation, is
returning to Earth after a hauling mission. On the way back, Mother, the ship’s computer,
detects a transmission from a nearby planet, LV-426. First interpreting it as an SOS, the
Nostromo is by law required to engage in a rescue-mission and to investigate the planet,
despite the complaints of the crew. Weyland-Yutani—“the company”—requires all its ships,
no matter the function, to investigate potential alien life. We learn later in the movie that the
company orders Ash, the ship’s scientist and android, to bring back the alien at all costs,
including the lives of the crew. The overarching plot of the movie is thus set upon
commercial interests—the company wants to exploit the alien for their weapons industry—at
the cost of human life. Numerous scholars have discussed the opposition between the
capitalist mega-corporation and the blue-collar crew, as well as the underlying Marxist
themes of the movie, but for my purposes it suffices to identify the theme of capitalist
exploitation of the workers and the aliens as a potential to create arms of destruction.
However, the company constantly fails to achieve their goals. On a global level, the company
fails to capture the alien in the first three movies, every time because of Ripley. She cleverly
uncovers their plan in Alien, she denounces the treacherous company man Burke (Paul
Reiser) in Aliens and convinces the crew to destroy the aliens, and in 3 she sacrifices
herself—and the alien in her—in front of the company itself, despite their promises (having
her life back, having children). The company finally manages to produce the alien through a
resurrected Ripley-clone in Resurrection, but their attempt at controlling it is a disaster: every
scientist and every soldier die painfully (significantly, by being penetrated by the alien’s tail
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through the head). At the beginning of Resurrection, Wren (J. E. Freeman), one of the
scientists says, “And the animal itself is wondrous. They'll be invaluable once we've
harnessed them,” to which Ripley replies “It's a cancer. You can't teach it tricks.” This
passage is significant because it illustrates the desire of the company to dominate and control
the alien like an animal. This theme of domination is the main purpose of the discovery of
alien life—colonization through knowledge. Yet, Ripley laughs at the presumption, because
she knows that such a domination is naïve and impossible. As the four movies repeatedly
demonstrate, patriarchy’s attempts at colonizing the aliened Other is a complete failure.
The desire to dominate and control is patriarchal, and it is explicitly exemplified in
Aliens, set almost 60 years after the first installment. In this opus, the company deploys a
colony on LV-426 in order to examine the alien of Ripley’s story. In one of the earliest
scenes of the movie, a happy white nuclear family is shown travelling on the planet in a
truck. There are several shots of the inside of the truck, in which the mother is scolding her
little boy and girl (who turns out to be Newt), while dad is driving. The familiarity of the
scene is reassuring even in this alien environment. Suddenly, the truck comes in front of a
vast mount, which the viewers of Alien recognize as the aliens’ hatch. After the father
proposes to go inside the mother asks, “Shouldn’t we call in?” to which he replies, “Let’s
wait till we know what to call it in as.” This scene, and in particular the father’s remark, is
extremely significant to what the alien means to the company. The father does not want to
inform anyone of their discovery before he can name it, and thereby appropriate it. The act of
naming is the privilege and duty of Adam in the Biblical story, who gives names to
everything Eve points at. Language is a prime tool of patriarchal hegemony that defines and
constructs thoughts and things. Language—at least, English—also works in binary systems
(woman/man, white/black, etc.), which defines everything in opposition to an Other. The
father’s desire to name the alien discovery is therefore an act of domination. Yet
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significantly, the alien never does acquire a name—even the movies’ titles refuse to name

it—and in the following couple of scenes, the father is the first one to be attacked by a
facehugger. This scene in Aliens is indicative of both the presumption of the patriarch to
dominate the fundamental Other, and at the same time what such a presumption will result
in—the father dies because he refuses to acknowledge the danger of the alien.
The desire to dominate the alien is conflated with the desire to control woman. In
Resurrection, when Ripley laughs at Wren’s suggestion to tame the alien, he quips “why not?
We’re teaching you [tricks].” Clone-Ripley is treated like the alien: put in a cage, she is
taught how to speak, how to behave. She is explicitly associated with an animal, as she is put
in shackles. Furthermore, the company’s repeated attempts to bring back aliens to Earth via
women, in Aliens and 3, exemplifies the ways in which the female body signifies an empty,
disposable carrier of a much more precious product—progeny, weapons/money. Like in the
Tale, Ripley’s body comes to represent a means to access a desired product. This product can
be attained by rape, a constant theme throughout the series.
In one of Alien’s key scene, a rape attempt takes place between Ash (Ian Holm) and
Ripley. Ash represents the thoughtless, corporate-driven employee who obeys orders at the
cost of his humanity. She has just discovered his plans to bring back the alien for the
company, and confronts him. Extreme close-ups alternate between Ripley’s and Ash’s face,
gauging each other. A close-up shows Ash’s hand pulling hair out of Ripley’s head. The next
shot is a canted angle of Ripley struggling on the floor. In the following sequence, shots
switch from a low-angle of Ash, to a straight-on-angle of Ripley lying on a bed. Ash takes a
rolled Playboy magazine and stuffs it down Ripley’s throat, a symbolical rape. Behind Ash
are pictures of naked women from magazines. The irony is that Ash, as an android, cannot
feel sexual urges. What he really does is mimic the heteronormative male dominance over
women. Interestingly, it is the Playboy magazine—object representing the hyper-
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sexualization of women—that he uses, as if to remind her that her role as a super-heroine

winning over men in the film is not what is expected of her. Finally, Parker (Yaphet Kotto)
and Lambert (Veronica Cartwright) are able to save Ripley from Ash’s grip. A fight between
Parker and Ash ensues; Ash firmly grips Parker’s breast, and Parker eventually halfdecapitates him with an iron bar. A high-angle shot shows the decapitated Ash on the floor,
the fight apparently over. Yet, this is only a classical red-herring and the monster rises up
again to attack Parker. A straight-on-angle reveals Parker on the floor, Ash struggling
between his legs in an explicitly rape-like position. Finally, Lambert has to impale Ash with a
tube to finish him. When Parker stands up, his shirt is torn and he is covered in the milky
substance of Ash’s “blood.” The explicit images of this double-rape are shocking, and it
represents the ultimate attempt at body subjection from the company. Yet, the point of the
scene is that the rapist is decapitated, annihilated. In the next sequence, Ripley probes
through Ash’s body with metallic instruments, perhaps the most intimate violation possible to
exert on an android. She only reanimates his head to obtain information, which symbolically
castrates him. Rendered impotent, he lies on the table like a grotesque doll. The destruction of
Ash and his reduction to an object in parts only symbolizes the power and superiority of both
victims over their aggressor. This victory is even more significant as technology is
consistently portrayed as superior to human beings in the sequels (Bishop is stronger and
faster than the men of the crew, Call is the one to save humanity).
The association between Parker and Ripley is meaningful in the context of their
struggle against patriarchal structures. Despite the many racist problems within the series 15,
teams such as Ripley, Lambert and Parker are significant, because they are the voices that are
not heard. One of the principal reasons of the failure of patriarchy is its self-representation as

The characters of color in the stories are stereotypical at best, and they inevitably die.
As Caroline Joan Picart has remarked, it is only upon white female bodies that the
possibilities of liminality can be expressed (“Ripley as Interstitial Character” 8).
15
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rational and rightful, and of minorities such as women and people of color as useless. One of
the first scenes in which Ripley takes action is set right after the first exploration of the
planet. Crew member Kane has been attacked by a facehugger, and he is brought back to the
ship by the captain and Lambert. Ripley refuses to open the hatch lest the ship be
contaminated, a decision which is not only her due right as next-in-command of the ship, but
also perfectly sane and rational. Nevertheless, Ash overrides her order and opens the door,
which literally launches the entire series of disasters that form the narrative. In the same
manner, Parker repeatedly recommends that Kane be ‘frozen’ (put in hyper-sleep), in order to
wait for a safer environment to extract the parasite—which is keeping him alive—from his
face. Once again, this seems like the safest, most rational decision to be made. But the captain
refuses to listen, which results in the alien being set free in the ship. Parker and Ripley are not
listened to or obeyed, and the result is mayhem. The very same trope is used in Aliens, in
which Ripley observes powerlessly the insouciance of the new crew in a parallel to the
breakfast scene of Alien. In this scene, the viewer, who has presumably watched Alien, is put
in a paradoxical position of dramatic irony because of her/his identification with Ripley and
her previous experience. She repeatedly tries to warn them of the danger of the alien race, but
they ignore her in their self-confidence and put everyone at risk. Therefore, it is because it
ignores the rational voices of minorities that patriarchy fails again and again.
Moreover, patriarchy’s failure is continual not only to its refusal to listen to Others,
but because it fails to understand them. Because the company keeps thinking of the alien as
an animal to be controlled for war purposes, it cannot comprehend the alien nor its purposes.
In Resurrection, a particularly telling scene exemplifies this fact. Dr Gediman (Brad Dourif),
the principal scientist of the ship, observes a group of aliens in their cage, behind a glass
window. One alien comes close to the window, and a pan shot shows the alien and the
scientist face to face. They start moving their heads rhythmically, and it is unclear who is
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mimicking who. Gediman closes his eyes and kisses the window sensually, to which the alien
responds by hitting the window with its independent mouth within the mouth. Gediman
punishes the creature with a stream of icy air. By this technique of assimilation, Gediman
seemingly teaches the alien to behave. Yet, some scenes later the aliens escape, and as a
military man enters the cage, an alien hits the icy-stream button, which reduces the man to icy
bits. The scientists of the company do not understand the behavior of the alien, and they
greatly underestimate its intelligence. Cameron’s Aliens in particular wrote the alien race as
intelligent as—or even superior to—the human beings 16, but this fact is never considered by
the company, even two hundred and fifty years after the first encounter. This failure to
recognize the aliened Other as non-animal, that is intelligent at a human level, is the other
main reason why the company consistently fails to achieve its colonization aims.
The presumption of the scientists to “teach [the alien] tricks” is thus blind and sterile
because it implies the refusal of the recognition of the Other as an equal entity. In addition,
and because minorities’ voices are unheard within the conflated patriarchal world, its
enterprises are doomed to fail again and again. The patriarchal desire to name the Other—
alien or female—is also void because of the truncated perception of the Other as inferior. The
series thus consistently portrays patriarchy as irrelevant to the postmodern universe.
Nevertheless, the failure of patriarchy to dominate and control its Others is productive of
anti-discourses. It offers possibilities to create non-hegemonic structures in a space in which
rules and conventions, such as the objectivity of science, the strong male hero, etc., do not
have any meaning. In a world in which patriarchy is a complete failure, the family, the role of
reproduction, and parenthood become irrelevant institutions; they can no longer be imposed

See for instance the aliens’ plot to gather all the humans in one place, then hide until
they can attack them all at once. Another example is when the aliens cut the electricity
of the ship in the same movie.
16
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by or stand as state apparatuses, because the constant colonization of humans by aliens
redefine the meaning and limits of the self.

Many scholars, such as Barbara Creed, have interpreted the premise of Alien to be a
fight between the “good” mother and the “bad” mother, the innocent asexual mother versus
the archaic/phallic mother, etc. When taken in context, though, the entire series demonstrates
that Ripley never does become a mother. Her two daughters—the unknown daughter and
Newt—die from directorial decisions, and she has at least two abortion scenes—in 3 when
she kills herself in a pit of lava, and in Resurrection, in which the Newborn is excruciatingly,
and bit and bit, expulsed into space. In fact, throughout the movies, Mother is constantly
killed. In Aliens, the Queen mother is also expulsed out into space, while her entire progeny
is burnt by Ripley. In 3, Ripley herself carries a Queen, and therefore she is exterminated by
fire. Finally in Resurrection, the Newborn devours its biological mother’s head, and while it
does not try to kill Ripley (its human mother), it is Ripley who rejects motherhood by killing
it. Even “Mother,” the computer of the Nostromo, is destroyed. The repeated elimination of
Mother, whether it be by meta-narrative incentives, or within the narrative itself, suggests the
obsolescence of a structure—motherhood—in a world in which woman-as-alien is the savior.
In the context of the academic discussion surrounding the movies, both the grotesquely
archaic, biological mother is repeatedly assassinated, but also the “good” mother that Ripley
represents, through the elimination of her progeny or the potential of a progeny. As a matter
of fact, “mother” is removed from Ripley’s body when the alien Queen is extracted in
Resurrection. Ripley remains alien, but she has made the “gift” of the human reproductive
system to the Queen. The capacity to reproduce has been symbolically displaced onto the
alien, who is destroyed by its product, the Newborn. The only other woman who survives
with Ripley, Call (Winona Ryder)—an android—despite her nurturing propensities, is
symbolically shot in the belly. Ripley perversely penetrates the hole left by the bullet, which
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is both sexual and at the same time mocking of the perpetual “hole” now left there. Therefore,

both Mother and progeny or the potential of progeny are repeatedly annihilated in the movies.
Consequently to the failure of patriarchy, Father is also killed at length, despite the religious
thematic of 3 in particular. In Resurrection, “Father” is the name of the computer controlling
the ship. As the film uses a subverted Frankenstein myth, in which science creates an alien
woman, “Father” represents the figure of patriarchy. Yet, towards the end, Call, the android
who is more humane than human beings, hacks “Father” to prevent Wren from stealing the
Betty (their escape ship). From a high-angle shot, Wren asks Father to allow him in, but gets
only silence. He repeats anxiously, mouth quivering: “Father?” Wren’s last quivering
supplication is definitively the symbol that Father/God is no longer in control. Maliciously,
Call says “Father’s dead, asshole.” Indeed, Father has been co-opted by the female android,
and there is no longer any hope for the scientist.
The death of Mother and Father becomes even more symptomatic, as the nuclear
family is also annihilated 17. As previously stated, Newt’s perfectly typical, white American
family and its accompanying clichés (dad drives, siblings fight, mother scolds—even down to
the typical family trip in a sci-fi version of a family car) is brutally eliminated from the
narrative. The viewers have access to the father’s death, face covered with the parasite, but
we do not even know what happened to the rest of the family. This is in itself somewhat
surprising, as a simple flashback could have appealed to the viewers’ sympathy, and the death
of the little boy is even more atypical. It is crucial to emphasize what Newt’s family
represents for the viewer. As a traditional white 2.5 children-family, the Jorden family stands
as suburban middle-class family at its finest. A classic American trope in science fiction or
action movies if often that such a family thrives and survives the tests of the narrative, and
emerges reinforced and reunited. Yet in Aliens, the family is mercilessly annihilated, which

17

In Aliens.
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signifies the ultimate failure of patriarchy, and at the same time the impossibility of its
structures in a space that is profoundly liminal.
Yet, perhaps the most interesting subversion of family conventions is the character of
Newt herself, and her relationship to Ripley. Newt is the sole survivor of the entire colony
established on LV-426. Although it is not exactly clear how, we learn later that part of her
survival was her faculty of adaptation and her understanding of aliens’ ways. She is the one
who guides Ripley’s crew through the tunnels with perfect precision, and she also tells them
the habits of the aliens to come out at night. Most importantly, Newt is extremely rational.
When the aliens take down the shuttle sent to save the crew, she reasons “I guess we are not
going to be leaving, now.” In fact, she is set in opposition to marine Hudson (Bill Paxton),
who becomes hysterical after the wreck of the shuttle. While he is screaming and raving, she
calmly proposes to get back inside. Newt thus defies the conventions of the little-girl role, in
which the child stands for innocence and must be saved. Newt saved herself the entire time
before the crew arrived, and now she serves as guide to the others. Moreover, her relationship
to Ripley is not a traditional one of mother-daughter. In “Adoptive versus Biological Mother
in Aliens,” Robin Roberts argues that Ripley’s and Newt’s relationship are that of equals,
because Newt does not need Ripley to survive. Roberts understands the alien queen as a
representation of the danger of biological motherhood, while she sees Ripley as an adoptive
mother. In other words, the mother-daughter relationship between Newt and Ripley defies
norms and traditions. The adoptive family, based on skills and trust, is valorized over the
traditional nuclear family, which cannot survive. In addition, the relationship between Ripley
and Newt is that of a single mother to a child, but nothing in their relation requires the need
for man as husband-father.
Furthermore, it is important to look more closely at Newt in order to understand the
important subversion made to the construction of the woman-subject. Before the alien
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invasion, Newt belonged to the cliché of the American family. Her experience after it and

because of it, though, has made her into another person. This transition is illustrated by the
picture that Ripley finds in her cache, which reads “Rebecca Jorden: Second Grade Citizen
Award.” The girl is depicted as a smiling, little blond angel—the radical opposite of the filthy
person unable to talk that the crew finds. Rebecca was the “citizen,” Newt—the first word
she pronounced, a name chosen by herself—is the survivor. Significantly, as Ripley is
washing her face (which a close-up reveals as cold and unblinking), she says “it’s hard to
believe there’s a little girl under all of this,” and indeed, no little girl is left. Newt’s difference
in terms of subject-formation is further apparent in the important motherly scene of Ripley
tucking her in bed. As Newt tells Ripley she does not want to sleep because of the bad
dreams she has (another parallel with Ripley), Ripley tells her that Stacey, her doll, does not
have bad dreams, and that she should try to “be like her.” Psychoanalysis understands dolls as
devices onto which children project both the ego, via identification, and the phallus in the
case of little girls. But Stacey is only a doll’s head, symbol of the fragmented ego that Newt
can only construct out of “Rebecca.” Furthermore, Newt pragmatically replies to Ripley’s
identification plea “She can’t have bad dreams because she’s just a piece of plastic.” Newt’s
refusal to identify with the doll is the first step for the little girl to reject the necessity of the
phallus.
In the next shots, shown from the point of view of Ripley, she denies the truth
inculcated by her mother—monsters do not exist—and forms her own opinion (there are real
monsters). This is the second step in the subject-formation. Finally, Newt confronts Ripley on
the subject of the primal scene, which she conflates with the alien parasite: “isn’t that how
babies come? I mean, people’s babies. They grow inside you.” A number of scholars have
pointed out that the alien’s way of being born comes from the myth that children often have,
that babies grow inside the mother’s stomach, and get out from the navel. Ripley replies that
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it is “very different”; yet, by the end of the series in Resurrection, the alien Queen has
adopted a mammalian reproductive system, and she, like Ripley, gives birth to an alienhuman creature. The alien childbirth scene, which obsesses Ripley through nightmares
throughout Aliens and 3, has become ‘human’ and produces half-human babies. As Ripley is
about to leave, and in a strange reversal, Newt plays the “gotcha” game upon Ripley. Newt
takes on the role of the mother for a brief moment, while Ripley, like a child, falls into the
trap and laughs. Scenes later, when Ripley comes back into the room to sleep with Newt, she
discovers her under the bed. This is significant to Newt’s refusal to go back to a comfortable
existence; she can no longer be Rebecca, she must always be Newt.
Newt’s subversion of the role of the child attests to the new rules and conventions of
family relations. She is equal to Ripley in terms of experience and maturity, and her process
of subject-formation rejects phallogocentric exigencies. Since the nuclear family, with
Mother and Father at its head, is no longer relevant or possible, the formation of the child,
and particularly of the female child, conforms to different systems and regulations. More
importantly, and in the larger context of the series as a whole, Newt represents the formation
of woman as a decisively liminal character, an entity which refuses fixed categories and
embraces fully postmodern.
Many scholars have argued about the importance of Resurrection, not only within the
global narrative of the series, but also in the ways it constructs woman as fundamentally
hybrid. As in Xenogenesis, hybridity and liminality are simply the necessary process for
survival in a technological world. Resurrection’s Ripley is the fundamental liminal character;
she is all at once human, alien, and clone. In the first scenes of the movie, the camera glides
slowly into the ship, doors opening onto a younger, hairless body of Ripley in a tube (such as
the ones in which the aliens are kept in Aliens). Two scientists—a woman and a man—frame
the scene, creators of the new Ripley. As the camera closes-up on her slightly changing face,
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a voice-over of Ripley quotes Newt’s affirmation from Aliens “My mommy always said there
were no monsters, no real ones, but there are.” But in this new context, it is unclear who the
monsters are: Ripley? The scientists? The aliens? Clone-Ripley is by essence monstrous, as
her alien-ness is apparent both physically and psychologically. Her hair is pulled back and
gelled up, her costume resemble the skin of the alien, her nails are long, sharp, and painted
green. Even the way she moves is not exactly human—she almost slithers. In addition, the
Ripley-clone has enhanced alien capacities, such as super strength, acid blood, and
invulnerability. In a memorable scene, alpha-male Johner (Ron Perlman) challenges her in
basketball, but cannot even touch her. He ends up thrown against a wall, powerless.
However, Ripley is also profoundly human. She sides with the crew and helps save the Earth.
More revealingly, she chooses to abort her human-alien child because of its grotesque alienness and its potential for destruction. In “Alien, (M)Others, Cyborgs: The Emerging Ideology
of Hybridity,” Patricia Linton argues that only hybrid characters can survive in Resurrection
(177). She reads Johner as a “human whose size and unusual facial contours…gesture
towards human/animal identity” and Vriess (Dominique Pinon)—who is in a wheelchair—as
a human/machine identity. Linton writes that the message of the film “is that survival of the
fittest favours the cyborg” (177). This fact is linked to the emphasis on the superiority of
technology over humans already mentioned. Much like the subtext of Xenogenesis, hybridity
is the means through which survival and the future are possible.
The scene in which Ripley discovers her clones establishes the profound humanness
and at the same time alien-ness of Ripley. As the crew attempts to leave the ship, Ripley is
seemingly attracted to a door marked “1-7.” A shot from behind the door shows Ripley’s face
marked with the numbers, which represent her genesis—the seven previous attempts at
cloning the Lieutenant Ripley. As she enters into the room, the camera alternates between
shots behind her, meant for the viewer to empathize with Ripley’s traumatic experience, and
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medium-long shots to close-ups, displaying the wide range of emotions she experiences—
disgust, empathy, pain, grief. This is the very first time in the movie that Ripley is shown

having any type of human emotion, and it is also the most poignant. The monstrous clones
are displayed one by one. The first is a fetus-looking creature with scales. The second looks
almost like Ripley, with its long, dark hair, but it has two horrific mouths. The third has the
morphology of an alien in human flesh. One other clone resembles a distorted Ripley, with
long, impossibly crooked fingers. The clones represent the monstrous potential of cloning and
of hybridity, and of technological pregnancies. Finally, clone 7 murmurs to Ripley. She is the
only one alive, and the closest representation of Ripley, although her limbs are all
enormously emphasized and crooked. Her naked body is inflated, covered in scars and veins.
Seven’s body is a grotesque representation of the body deformed by pregnancy and age. The
clone whispers “kill me,” to which Ripley very emotionally obliges. She torches the entire lab
in a cathartic moment. This action bears several important meanings. Firstly, it proves once
and for all Ripley’s humanity; the killing of seven is an act of compassion and empathy.
Secondly, Ripley destroys her genesis as a synthetic being. In embracing her humanity, she
necessarily has to reject the synthetic nature of her creation—in killing seven and the other
clones, she kills parts of herself. Moreover, the clones stand for the horrors of hybridity gone
terribly awry. Ripley annihilates the creatures whose hybridity was imperfect, who could not
survive, so that she—a perfect symbiosis—could live in their stead. Yet, in killing these
necessary experiments that led to her creation, she is also forced to face her own alien-ness,
as it is literally displayed in front of her as repeated evidence of the dual nature of her
identity. Ripley number eight is also number one to seven, and more. What the monstrous
clones broadcast so effectively and horribly are the elements that constitute Ripley’s identity
inside.
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Moreover, Ripley not only has to face her own alien-ness, she also must embrace the
abject inside herself. Throughout the entire four movies that constitute the Alien franchise,
there is not one establishing shot of Ripley and an alien looking at each other. Frequently, the
director use shot reverse-shots to film her interactions with the monster. While the viewer
understands what Ripley and the alien are looking at, the point is that the series never
establishes a shot in which both characters are seen looking at each other. In fact, there are at
least two instances in which Ripley directly refuses to look at the alien. The first happens
towards the end of Aliens. The Queen pursues Ripley onto the platform from which the ship
is ready to leave. Ripley is holding Newt, and thinking that this is the end, as the ship is
nowhere in sight, she closes her eyes. Significantly, she tells Newt to imitate her (“Close your
eyes, baby”). The second instance, perhaps even more remarkable, happens in 3, as Clemens
has just been taken away by the alien. The creature looms over Ripley, who is powerless, its
face inches from her. This is one of the most famous scenes of the franchise.

Ripley’s face is turned towards the camera, and her eyes are closed. I insist on this refusal to
look at the monster in light of Linda Williams’ famous argument in her essay “When the
Woman Looks” (1986), in which she compellingly argues that woman cannot look at the
monster without being punished. The camera reveals the monster before the woman sees him,
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which forces the viewer to identify with the monster, rather than with the victim. The point of
Williams’ article is that the monster and the woman represent the same threat to the
vulnerable man, that of sexual difference. In looking at the monster, the woman recognizes
herself in the eyes of the male, and at the same time she is faced with her own castration.
Williams’ essay is extremely interesting when applied to the Alien series, precisely because
Ripley never does look at the monster (despite having fought and killed it repeatedly!), until
the very end.

The first and unique establishing shot (see above) that we have of Ripley looking at
the monster is when the Newborn seeks her affection. For the first time then, the alien and
Ripley are put on the same level, they are equal, they reflect each other, and it can only
happen after the Newborn chooses Ripley over the alien Queen, and in so doing, chooses
humanity. The act of looking signifies Ripley’s final acceptation of her hybridity. The
Newborn is a mirror-image of herself; it is, like her, human and alien, and it is, like her,
conflicted between its allegiances to both aspects of its heritage. Yet, it is also monstrous
both in appearance and behavior; it violently kills both alien (the Queen) and humans
(Distephano), which is why she must reject and abort it. In looking, Ripley accepts that she is,
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like the clones and like the Newborn, the monster. However, she is not punished for looking;

on the contrary, her self-identification with the Newborn completes her identity as forever
liminal and transgressive, both alien and human, both self and abject.
In “Monstrous Bodies, Monstrous Sex: Queering Alien Resurrection,” Brenda M.
Boyle understands Ripley as fundamentally queer, not in the sense of sexuality, but rather in
the ways in which she rejects categorization and fixed, single identities. She argues that it is
“Ripley’s human/alien status, her confounding of all boundaries in a confounded world”
which gives her power (169). Alien: Resurrection’s force is precisely in the accurate
representation of postmodernity pushed to the extremes. As the series consistently rejects
such institutions as the family, Mother and Father, and the possibility of heterosexual
relationships, it shapes in the meantime a hybrid, liminal woman who rejects and refuses all
categories of identity. In a world in which such a woman not only exists, but survives and is
left unpunished, then, such concerns around reproduction, gender, and sexuality become
irrelevant. However, and for the first time in the series, an alien—Ripley—is indeed going to
come back home. How can we interpret the return of Ripley to Earth? While she has proven
her humanity throughout the film, her alien-ness remains a threat, especially as her
invulnerable, eternal female body signifies the possibility of reproduction. As she stands with
Call at the window of the ship, looking down on Earth, smiling enigmatically to herself, the
viewer cannot help but wonder whether the series concludes on a happy-ending (the heroine
has saved the world), or on a horrible one (the alien reaches Earth). Or both.
Where both Butler’s Xenogenesis and Atwood’s Tale pessimistically predicted the
unchanging nature of patriarchal oppression, the Alien series concludes in the victory of the
woman as hybrid, the “queer” entity that rejects fixed categories of identity and simply exists
in between. Ripley’s enigmatic smile at the end of Resurrection is the ultimate signifier of the
resistance of the texts: it is a screw-you note to resolutions, happy-endings, and expectedness.
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Resistance does not have to mean the end of humanity as it is as with Xenogenesis; nor does
it have to be futile like in Tale. Alien: Resurrection represents difference and liminality as
hopeful.
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